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Summary
This thesis concerns two problems in the eld of mathematical nance: portfolio
selection and derivative pricing. The rst and second parts of the thesis are re-
lated to portfolio selection under transaction costs. In the rst part, we consider
the investment problem in a market that switches stochastically between bull and
bear regimes. The investor does not fully observe the state of the market and
incurs transaction costs. We investigate this problem, focusing on two main im-
plications. First, we show that in this framework the investor is mainly a trend
follower, buying on the upswings and selling on the downswings. Second, compared
to the full information case, we show that incomplete information about the state
of the market can signicantly amplify the magnitude of the eect of transaction
costs on liquidity premia. In the second part, we study the optimal decision of
an investor who can invest in both nancial assets and illiquid risky house and
who has voluntary retirement choice. We are the rst to study the joint decision
of illiquid housing and voluntary retirement. We show that the investor will op-
timally retire if her current human capital is small enough compared to the total
wealth. Moreover the investor adopts signicantly dierent housing strategy before
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and after retirement. Both investment and consumption choice jump at the retire-
ment date. In the third part, we investigate the superhedging problem under ratio
constraint through the method of variational inequality. We introduce the double
obstacle problems equivalent to the original variational inequalities. Through the
obstacle problems, we are easy to nd that the upper prices of some claims un-
der ratio constraint can be expressed as the Black-Scholes price of an associated
unconstrained claim. For other constrained claims whose upper prices cannot be
written as the Black-Scholes price of an associated unconstrained claim, studying
the double obstacle problem turns out to be an eective method to characterize
the superhedging strategy.
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Chapter1
Introduction
Portfolio selection and derivative pricing are the two most important topics in the
eld of mathematical nance. Merton (1969, 1971) came up with the portfolio
selection problem under continuous time Brownian motion driven setting. From
then, much eort has been devoted to this area. Standard literature based on
Merton's model nds that the typical trading strategy is of the contrarian type,
according to which investors buy on downswings and sell on upswings, and that
transaction cost does not greatly aect the liquidity premia, which investors re-
quire to make them indierent between holding a stock that incurs transaction
costs, and holding an equivalent asset that does not. These theoretical results and
empirical evidence contradict each other. Thus there is good reason to extend Mer-
ton's model to reconcile theory and practice with respect to the trading strategy
and liquidity premium. On the other hand, as well known housing and retirement
decisions are among the most important lifetime investment and consumption de-
cisions. However, no existing literature considers this join decision partly because
of the diculty caused by the signicant illiquidity in the housing market and the
many factors that aect retirement decision. Thus there is also a very good rea-
son to incorporate illiquid house and voluntary retirement into Merton's model.
1
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Regarding the derivative pricing, if the market is arbitrage-free, complete and un-
constrained, the pricing problem is fully understood. However in the real nancial
market, the seller of option generally could not leverage or buy and sell as many
shares of underlying as she like, which would introduce new diculty into the pric-
ing problem and motivates our last research problem about superhedging under
ratio constraints.
1.1 Trend Following and Liquidity Premium
The rst part of this thesis is related to research on optimal portfolio selection
under trading costs. We study the eect of the lack in information about stock
prices on their trading strategy and liquidity premia.
Existing research on portfolio selection has been focusing almost exclusively
on contrarian trading strategies. In the seminal work of Merton (1969, 1971), the
optimal policy is a typical contrarian strategy: the investor builds-up her potion
on a risky asset after a price decrease, and she sells or unwinds her position on
this asset after a increase in its price, so as to keep a constant proportion of
the portfolio value invested in this asset. Such a strategy is optimal in a setup
in which the investment opportunity set is constant, short selling and borrowing
are not allowed, and trading is costless. Magill and Constantinides (1976) then
introduced transaction costs into Merton's model. Continuous trading is no longer
possible in this case, but the optimal strategy is still contrarian. Many subsequent
papers analyzed the portfolio selection problem under trading costs (e.g. Davis
and Norman (1990), Shreve and Soner (1994), Liu and Loewenstein (2002), Dai
and Yi (2009)). They all concluded that, when there is no short-selling or leverage,
the investor's optimal strategy is typically contrarian. However, empirical evidence
tells us that investors are also trend followers, buying long on the upswings, and
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selling short on the downswings. According to Covel (2003), trend following is a
trading strategy that has consistently delivered extraordinary prots in bull and
bear markets alike, for many years. Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) found
that 77% of the mutual funds in their sample buy stocks that were past winners,
however most did not systematically sell past losers. Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen
documented an asset pricing anomaly they call \time series momentum," which is
a concept closely related to the trend following strategy we explore in this thesis.
Despite its practical popularity, surprisingly little has been written about trend
following trading strategies in the analytical literature. Notable exception is the
paper by Dai, Zhang and Zhu (2010). However some of the assumptions of this
paper were too restricted and somewhat unrealistic. For example they imposed
that the investor has to put her entire wealth either in the risky asset or in bank
account, and they also only allow for log utility investors. Thus, the rst objective
of the rst part of this thesis is to propose a more general theoretical framework
that is able to generate trend following as part of an investor's optimal trading
policy.
Regarding the study of the magnitude of the eect that transaction costs can
have on liquidity premia (the maximum expected return an investor is willing to
exchange for zero transaction cost), there has been a long lasting disconnect be-
tween the empirical evidence and the theoretical results. A long body of research
has been conducted on the optimal portfolio choice in the presence of transaction
costs, starting with the seminal work of Magill and Constantinides (1976). The
presence of transaction costs signicantly changes the optimal portfolio choice of
investors. In particular, under transaction costs, continuous and unlimited trading
(as in Merton (1969, 1971)) is no longer possible, and even a very small transaction
charge can dramatically reduce the frequency of trading of an investor. However,
most studies on transaction costs (e.g. Constantinides (1986), Davis and Norman
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(1990), and Liu (2004)) found that the liquidity premium is surprisingly small rel-
ative to the transaction cost rate, and concluded that transaction costs only have
a second-order eect for asset pricing. For example, Constantinides (1986) found
that the liquidity premium to (round-trip) transaction cost (LPTC) ratio is only
about 0.07 for a proportional (round-trip) transaction cost of 1%. However, this
conclusion is not in line with many empirical ndings that suggest that transaction
costs signicantly inuence the time-series and the cross-section of stock returns.
For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) found that the LPTC ratio is about
1.90 for NYSE stocks. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Pastor and Stam-
baugh (2003) found that the dierence in expected returns across portfolios sorted
on liquidity measures is in the order of 6% to 7% per annum, while Lesmond,
Trzcinka, and Ogden (1999) quantied the transaction costs associated with trad-
ing individual stocks and nd a 3% cost for the ve smallest size deciles and a 1%
cost for the ve largest.
Some recent work by Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007), Dai, Li, Liu,
and Wang (2010), and Lynch and Tan (2011) provided us with better results on
the magnitude of the eect of transaction costs on liquidity premia. In particular,
Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007) showed that transaction costs can have a
signicantly larger eect on liquidity premia when it is assumed that the investment
opportunity set of the investor varies over time, which induces the need to trade
more frequently. However, the LPTC ratio they nd, for reasonable calibration,
is still only about 0.25, which is short relative to what is suggested by empirical
evidence. Lynch and Tan (2011) showed that, using a discrete-time framework,
and incorporating return predictability, labor income, and state-dependent trans-
action costs, can signicantly improve the magnitude of the eect of transaction
costs on liquidity premia. However, after reasonable calibration, their result is still
signicantly smaller than what is documented in empirical evidence (e.g. Brennan
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and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)). More successful
results are obtained by Dai, Li, Liu, and Wang (2010). They showed that, if one
incorporates the well-established fact that market volatility during trading periods
is signicantly larger than the one during non-trading periods, then transaction
costs have a rst-order eect on liquidity premia, which is comparable to that sug-
gested by the empirical evidence. For instance, they found that, when volatility
during trading periods is three times that of non-trading periods, the LPTC ratio
is about 1.76, for a proportional (round-trip) transaction cost of 1%. Observe that
these recent work basically say that we need time-variation in the investment op-
portunity set of the investor in order for the transaction costs to have a larger eect
on liquidity premia. In some existing models, only with time-variation opportunity
set the resulting LPTC ratio still cannot get close to what has been shown in em-
pirical evidence (as in Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007)). Thus our second
objective of the rst part of this thesis is to show that, if we impose the constraint
that the investor is only allowed to access part of the information related to the
price process of the risky asset, we can amplify signicantly the magnitude of this
eect.
In the rst part of this thesis, we build on the model of Jang, Koo, Liu, and
Loewenstein (2007). They showed that the transaction cost can have a rst-order
eect on the liquidity premia when the risky asset price follows a stochastic regime-
switching process. However they assumed that the switching times between the
bull and bear market are fully observable from the market place. We relax that
assumption, which is somewhat unrealistic, and restrict the investor to be able
to observe only partially the changes in stock market regimes. In particular, we
extend the model of Dai, Zhang, and Zhu (2010) which assumed a regime switching
market but where the exact switching times are not fully observable. For simplicity,
in their model they imposed that the investor has to put her entire wealth either
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in stock or in bank account, and they also only allowed for log utility investors.
We analyze a more general version of this model in which the investor exhibits
power-utility preferences. Also we allow the investor to allocate her dollar amount
in the bank account and the risky asset account freely. Our framework in the
rst part is therefore a portfolio selection problem with time-varying investment
opportunities and incomplete information. We are able to reformulate our model as
a singular stochastic control with complete information by using the lter proposed
in Wonham (1965). The resulting value function turns out to be the solution of a
two-dimensional parabolic variational inequality equation.
1.2 Illiquid Housing Investment and Voluntary
Retirement
Housing and retirement decisions are among the most important lifetime invest-
ment and consumption decisions. However, no existing literature considered this
joint decision, partly because of the diculty caused by the signicant illiquidity
in the housing market and the many factors that aect the retirement decision.
In the second part of this thesis, we aim to study the optimal joint decision of an
investor on housing, consumption of a nondurable good, investment in the nancial
market, and retirement.
The housing asset diers from the nancial assets. It not only serves as an
investment vehicle, but also provides the investor with housing services. In our
model, we assume the investor derives utility from consuming a numeraire good
as well as a house that is costly to adjust. Our rst objective is to examine how
the transaction cost of the housing asset and the investor's preferences over the
numeraire good consumption and the housing services aect her housing, nancial
investment and consumption of the numeraire good. To fulll this objective, we
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consider an investor after retirement or equivalently a worker who receives con-
tinuous labor income and never retires for simplicity. In fact, if the investor's
consumption services are generated just from the numeraire good, our setup can
be simplied to the portfolio problem of an investor who trades a risk-free asset, a
liquid risky asset (stock), and an illiquid risky asset (house) that is subject to the
no-short-selling constraint and the proportional transaction costs for selling. Dai,
Jin and Liu (2011) investigated the optimal investment in a similar framework and
found that the presence of the transaction costs creates a no-trading region for the
illiquid asset. When consumption is derived also from the risky house services,
Yao and Zhang (2005) showed that a no-trading region for the housing asset exists
and when close to the trigger bounds of the no-trading region, the investor holds
a higher proportion of the portfolio value in the liquid nancial assets.
We assume the investor receives stochastic labor income before retirement, the
growth rate of which is positively correlated to the housing return (as in Yao
and Zhang (2005)). Dierent from the existing literature on the illiquid housing
investment, we further assume the investor has free choice of retirement date.
Dybvig and Liu (2010) studied the optimal consumption and investment of a worker
who has voluntary retirement and who trades a bond and a liquid risky asset. They
showed that the retirement exibility can signicantly aect optimal consumption
and investment. With voluntary retirement, there exists an optimal wealth-to-wage
ratio threshold for retirement. Moreover both consumption and portfolio choice
jump at the endogenous retirement date. We incorporate the illiquid housing asset
into the model of Dybvig and Liu (2010). Our second objective in this part is
to investigate what factors (e.g., nancial wealth, house value, growth rate and
volatility of salary etc.) will aect the optimal time to retire, how they aect it
and in turn how retirement aects the optimal housing and investment decisions?
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1.3 Superhedging under Ratio Constraints
In nancial market, the pricing of contingent claims is always an important issue.
Since the pioneering option pricing work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton
(1973) in the complete market, much research has been done to relax the assump-
tions on the market. Under this framework, an option or a contingent claim  with
exercise time T can be replicated by investing in the underlying market during
[0; T ] with a large enough initial portfolio value. The minimal initial investment,
which has to be invested to achieve this target, is called the upper price (or the
seller's price) of the contingent claim. And the corresponding portfolio is called
the superhedging strategy.
If the market is arbitrage-free, complete and unconstrained, then from the
classical results of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), the upper price
of a contingent claim  is given by the expectation of the discounted obligation
under the risk-neutral probability measure. The trading strategies to replicate this
contingent claim can be found by Ito^ martingale representation theorem or the
backward stochastic dierential equation (BSDE in short). These trading strategies
are in some sense rather unrealistic for the investors. For example, the investor
may need to employ very risky strategies, by investing huge amounts of money in
the bond or in the risky asset. However in the real nancial world the investor
could not leverage too extensively or trade as many shares of underlyings as she
likes.
So it is more reasonable to consider the problem under certain constraints for
the admissible trading strategies. There are extensive literatures in mathematical
nance on the superhedging problem with consumption under the portfolio con-
straints, such as Cvitanic and Karatzas (1992), El Karoui and Quenez (1995), and
Karatzas and Kou (1996). In these papers, the authors studied the hedging of a
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contingent claim with constrained portfolios to take values in a given closed convex
set. The upper price or minimum initial investment is equal to the supremum of
the Black-Scholes prices of the claim over a family of auxiliary markets, which are
more complicated in structure but without constraints. However it is generally not
easy to derive the upper price directly through this abstract formula.
In the third part, we study a very interesting case of constraints: the portfolio
ratio constraints, i.e. to keep the fraction of the portfolio value invested in stock in
a certain xed interval. Under the framework of Black{Scholes, Broadie, Cvitanic
and Soner (1998) showed that the upper price of some contingent claim with the
portfolio ratio constraints is equal to the price of a related dominating claim with-
out portfolio constraints and the superhedging strategy is just the hedging strategy
for a face-lifted contingent claim. This result holds for those options whose payos
at expiration are a function of the nal prices of the underlying assets and some
special path-dependent options such as lookback option. Cuoco and Liu (2000)
extended this result to the case with nonlinear wealth dynamics but they did not
study the path dependent options. Schmock, Shreve and Wystup (2002) extended
the results in Broadie, Cvitanic and Soner (1998) to some path-dependent options
under the short-selling constraints. In particular, they reformulated the complex
abstract formula given in the previous literatures from the angle of stochastic
control and found the explicit upper price for some path-dependent options by
inspection.
We apply the method of variational inequality to study the superhedging prob-
lem of contingent claims under ratio constraints. Under the denition of superhedge
strategy, we rstly formulate the problem as BSDE with general constraints as in
Peng (1999). Then based on the relation between the variational inequality and
the BSDE with ratio constraints, we give the variational inequality for the upper
price of the constrained contingent claims. Thanks to the clever approach in Dai
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and Yi (2009), we can investigate the superhedging problem under the ratio con-
straints through a double obstacle problem, which is equivalent to the variational
inequality. Our method is easy implement and can be used to price a majority
of contingent claims including path-dependent options. Through the associated
double obstacle problem, it is easy to nd that the upper price of some constrained
option can be expressed as the Black-Schoels price of some related unconstrained
claim, whose nal payo dominates the original one. Such constrained options
include the European vanilla options and the oating strike arithmetic Asian call
options under the constant ratio constraints. In this paper we also study the Eu-
ropean vanilla call under time-varying constraints and the xed strike arithmetic
Asian option under constant ratio constraints. To price these two constrained
options one cannot simply change their terminal payos and nd the associated
Black-Scholes prices. However through the associated double obstacle problem, we
can eectively characterize the seller's hedging strategy.
1.4 Scope of This Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 studies the portfolio
selection problem under non-observable bull and bear regime switching market.
Trend following strategy and liquidity premium are our main concern. Chapter
3 investigates the consumption and investment problem with illiquid housing and
voluntary retirement. Our results indicate the joint decision of an investor on
housing, consumption of a nondurable good, investment in the nancial market,
and retirement. Chapter 4 is devoted to the superhedging problem under portfolio
ratio constraints. Variational inequality method is applied to price the European
vanilla options and the xed strike arithmetic Asian options. We conclude in the
last chapter.
Chapter2
Trend Following and Liquidity Premium
The standard literature on dynamic asset allocation (e.g. Merton (1969, 1971))
nds that the typical trading strategy is of the contrarian type, according to which
investors buy on downswings and sell on upswings. Standard literature (e.g. Con-
stantinides (1986)) also nds that, even though transaction costs can dramatically
alter the way investors trade, that do not seem to aect signicantly their utility,
which in turn do not aect the liquidity premia these investors require in order
to make them indierent between holding a stock that incurs transaction costs,
and holding an equivalent asset that does not. These two theoretical results both
contradict what has been found in practice. In this chapter, we will propose a
framework that is able to reconcile theory and practice with respect to (i) the pop-
ularity of trend following trading strategies, and (ii) the magnitude of the eect of
transaction costs on liquidity premia.
2.1 The Investor's Problem
Suppose an investor trades in a nancial market consisting of a risky asset (stock)
and a money market account growing at a constant risk-free rate, according to the
11
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process dBt = rBtdt. The stock price, denoted by St; evolves according to the
following dynamics:
dSt = St[("t)dt+ dwt]
where  is the constant volatility parameter, "t 2 f1; 2g is a two-state Markov
chain, "t = ("t) is the expected return rate, wt is a standard Brownian motion
independent of "t.
The process "t represents the market mode at each time t. In particular, "t = 1
indicates a bull market and "t = 2 indicates a bear market. We assume 1 > 0 and
2 < 0. Let 1 and 2 denote the switching intensity from bull to bear and from
bear to bull, respectively.
Our investor can buy the stock at the ask price SAt = (1 + )St and she can
sell it at the bid price SBt = (1   )St, where   0 and 0   < 1 represent the
proportional transaction cost rates for purchases and sales, respectively. Assume
the investor holds the amount of xt in a money market account and yt in a stock
account. In the presence of transaction costs, xt and yt evolve according to:
dxt = rxtdt  (1 + )dLt + (1  )dMt (2.1)
and dyt = iytdt+ ytdwt + dLt   dMt (2.2)
where Lt andMt are right continuous, non-negative, and non-decreasing processes,
with L0 =M0 = 0. The parameters Lt andMt represent cumulative dollar amounts
of purchases and sales of stock, respectively.
The investor's problem is to allocate her wealth between the money market and
the stock account so as to maximize the utility of terminal liquidated wealth, i.e.,
maxE(u(WT )), where the liquidated wealth is given by
Wt = xt + (1  )y+t   (1 + )y t
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and the utility function of the investor is of the CRRA type (constant relative risk
aversion), which takes the form
u(W ) =
8><>:
log(W ) if  = 1 (log utility);
W 1 
1  if  6= 1;  > 0 (power utility):
Given that market regulations often prevent investors from excessive usage of




 a; 8 t > 0 (2.3)
where  1

< a < 0 and 1 < a < 1

. These constraints imply that the investor is not
allowed to borrow more than a   1 times his wealth or short-sell stocks of value
greater than a times his wealth. When a =  1

and a = 1

, the constraint (2.3)
becomes the well-known solvency constraint (e.g. Davis and Norman (1990)).
In the following sub-sections, we describe the problem of the investor under
two dierent setups: (i) one in which enough information has been supplied to the
investor { the state of the market regime is fully observable, and (ii) the other in
which the investor is given only partial information about the state of the market
regime.
2.1.1 Full Information
Lets consider rst the case in which market regimes are fully observable. In this
case, the investor can observe not only stock prices but also the market regimes
directly from the marketplace. In other words, the investor knows exactly what is
the state of the market regime she is living in. In this setting, we can dene the
investor's value function in regime i 2 f1; 2g to be:
(x; y; i; t) = sup
(L;M)
E [u(WT )jxt = x; yt = y; "t = i] : (2.4)
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This value function, under some regularity conditions, can be shown to be the
viscosity solution of the following HJB equation:
maxft +Oi; (1  )x   y; (1 + )x + yg = 0; i = 1; 2; (2.5)
with terminal condition:
(x; y; i; T ) = u(x+ (1  )y+   (1 + )y ) (2.6)
and boundary conditions:
(1  )x   y = 0 on y
x+ y
= a (2.7)
(1 + )x   y = 0 on y
x+ y
= a (2.8)
where Oi = 1
2
2y2yy + rxx + iyy + i((x; y; j; t)  (x; y; i; t)); j 6= i.
Due to the homogeneity of the utility function, we can reduce one dimension
of this problem by setting z = y
x+y
and rearranging as follows:
(x; y; i; t) =
8><>:
1
1   (x+ y)
(1 )e(1 )v(z;i;t) if  6= 1;
v(z; i; t) + log(x+ y) if  = 1:
It can be checked that v(z; i; t) satises the PDE8>>>>><>>>>>:
maxfvt +Oiv +Oiv; (z   1)vz   ; (1 + z)vz   g = 0;
vz(a; t) =





v(z; i; T ) = u(1  z+   z );
(2.9)




z2(1  z)2(vzz + (1  )vz2) + (i   r   2z)z(1  z)vz + (i   r)z








i(v(z; j; t)  v(z; i; t)); j 6= i;  = 1;
i
1  (e
(1 )(v(z;j;t) v(z;i;t))   1); j 6= i;  6= 1:
Let's consider next the case in which the investor is uncertain about the state of
the market regime she is living in.
2.1.2 Partial Information
Assume that, at each time t, the investor observes the current stock price and all
the prices since the beginning of the investment period, but she does not know
for sure whether the price is currently in an up trend (bull market) or in a down
trend (bear market). In other words, the state of the current regime "t is not
fully observable. In order to complete this structure in which we only have partial
information, we make use of the lter in Wonham (1965). Using this tool, we can
convert our problem into an equivalent one with complete information.
Let pt = p("t = 1jSt) denote the conditional probability of "t = 1 (bull market)
given the ltration St = fSu : 0  u  tg. It can be shown that (see Wonham
(1965)):
dpt = ( (1 + 2)pt + 2)dt+ (1   2)pt(1  pt)

d bwt (2.10)
where bwt is the innovation process (see e.g. Osendal (2003)) given by:
d bwt = d log(St)  [(1   2)pt + 2   2=2]dt

: (2.11)
The investor does not know for sure what is the state of the current market regime,
but she can estimate the probability of being in a bull market. We can then re-
dene the value function to be:
 (x; y; p; t) = sup
(L;M)
E [u(WT )jSt; xt = x; yt = y; pt = p] : (2.12)
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Given that St can be re-written in terms of bwt,
dSt = St[(1   2)pt + 2]dt+ Std bwt (2.13)
then the investor's stock account evolves according to
dyt = ((1   2)pt + 2)ytdt+ ytd bwt + dLt   dMt:
It can be shown that, the value function  satises the following HJB equation8>>>><>>>>:
maxf t + L ; (1  ) x    y; (1 + ) x +  yg = 0;
(1  ) x    y = 0 on yx+y = a; (1 + ) x    y = 0 on yx+y = a;
 (x; y; p; T ) = u(x+ (1  )y+   (1 + )y );
(2.14)







 pp + Ey y + py yp + rx x + ( (1 + 2)p+ 2) p
where
E = (1   2)p+ 2; (2.15)
p =
(1   2)p(1  p)

(2.16)
and where E and p denote the conditional expectation of the value of the (un-
certain) stock price drift, and of its volatility, respectively. These two terms play
important roles in the investor's trading strategy, as we describe below.
Similar to the case with complete information, we can reduce one dimension of
this problem by setting z = y
x+y
and
 (x; y; p; t) =
8><>:
1
1   (x+ y)
(1 )e(1 )V (z;p;t) if  6= 1;
V (z; p; t) + log(x+ y) if  = 1:
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As a result, the system of equations (2.14) can be simplied in the following way,8>>>>><>>>>>:
maxfVt + L1V; (z   1)Vz   ; (1 + z)Vz   g = 0;
Vz(a; p; t) =





V (z; p; T ) = u(1  z+   z );
(2.17)




z2(1  z)2(Vzz + (1  )Vz2) + 1
2
p
2(Vpp + (1  )Vp2)
+ pz(1  z)(Vpz + (1  )VzVp) + ( (1 + 2)p+ 2 + (1  )pz)Vp




Next, we present the investor's optimal investment policies for the cases with
and without transaction costs, both in a setting with full information and a setting
with partial information.
2.2 Optimal Investment Policies
For the purpose of comparison, and for the sake of completeness, we rst provide
the investor's optimal investment policies for the case with no transaction costs.
2.2.1 Optimal Policy without Transaction Costs
In the following theorem, we summarize the theoretical results under no transaction
costs for both the case with full information and the case with partial information.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose  =  = 0, a =  1

and a = 1

, an investor with full
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Proof. When there are no transaction costs, we can use the investor's wealth w =
x + y as the state variable. In the fully observable regime-switching model, the








2w2ww + (r + (i   r)zi)ww + i((w; j; t)  (w; i; t))

= 0; j 6= i;
(w; i; t) = u(w):
(2.18)
While in the regime-switching model with incomplete information, the investor's
value function  (w; p; t) follows8>>>><>>>>:









z2w2 ww + [r + (E   r)z]w w + pzw pwg = 0;
 (w; p; T ) = u(w):
(2.19)
Note that solutions to the problems above have the following form,
(w; i; t) =
8><>:
log(w) + v(i; t) if  = 1;
w1 
1  e
(1 )v(i;t) if  6= 1:
(2.20)
 (w; p; t) =
8><>:
log(w) + V (p; t) if  = 1;
w1 
1  e
(1 )V (p;t) if  6= 1:
(2.21)
Plugging (2.20) into (2.18) and plugging (2.21) into (2.19), we nish the proof for
Theorem 2.1.
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2.2.2 Optimal Policy with Transaction Costs
Here, we provide theoretical results for the case with transaction costs. We rst
analyze the problem with full information. Given the concavity in x and y of the
original value function, we can characterize the trading strategy in regime i by two
boundaries, which split the state space (z; t) into three regions: the buy region
(BRi), the sell region (SRi), and the no-transaction (NTi) region.
Theorem 2.2. Assume Zi is the optimal strategy in regime i for the case with full
information and no transaction costs, as given in Theorem 2.1, and assume also
there exist Zs(i; t) and Zb(i; t) in each regime i such that vz(z; i; t) and vt(z; i; t)
are continuous across them and
BRi = f(z; t); z  Zb(i; t)g ; (2.22)
SRi = f(z; t); z  Zs(i; t)g : (2.23)
Then






















Proof. We learn from (2.9) that,
vt +Oiv +Oiv  0; in BRi and SRi;
vt +Oiv +Oiv = 0; in NTi:
According to the assumption, BRi is below no trading region in regime i, while SRi
is above the no-trading region. We nd vt +Oiv +Oiv is increasing (decreasing)












 0; z = Zs(i; t):
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where bOiv is given by
bOiv =2
2
z2(1  z)2(vzz + 2(1  )vvz) + [i   r + 2   (2 + )2z
+ (1  )2z(1  z)v)]z(1  z)vz + [(i   r)(1  2z) 
2z(2  3z) + (1  )2z(1  2z)(1  z)v)]v   2z + i   r:
(2.26)













  vz(z; j; t))  0:
After rearranging, we nd,
 2z(1 + ) + (1 + z)(i   r)  0:
This inequality, together with the position limits, implies (2.24). In a similar way,
we can obtain (2.25).
Remark 2.2.1. We make the assumption of smoothness of v(z; i; t) based on the
results in Dai and Yi (2009) which fully analyzed a variational inequality with
gradient constraint.
For illustration, we provide some numerical results. We calibrate our baseline
model using the parameter values estimated for the U.S. equity market by Ang
and Bekaert (2002). In particular, we use the estimates from their basic model, as
follows: r = 0:05, 1 = 0:2353, 2 = 1:7391, d logSt = 0:1539dt + 0:1306dwt in a
bull market, and d log St =  0:1546dt + 0:2438dwt in a bear market. From these
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estimates, the expected return rates in bull and bear markets are 1 = 0:165 and
2 =  0:1435, respectively. As we mentioned before, in order to be able to use
the lter suggested in Wonham (1965), we need to assume that , the volatility
of our risky asset returns, is constant across bull and bear regimes. We derive the








which results in  = 0:1487. Note that the average length of a single run in regime
i (in years) is given by 1=i. Therefore, a bull regime in our model lasts on average
4.25 years, while a bear regime lasts on average 0.58 years. We also assume, in our
baseline model, transaction cost rates for purchases and sales of risky asset equal
to 1% ( =  = 0:01). In the baseline case, our investor's risk aversion parameter
() is equal to 2, and the investment horizon is 10 years.
In Figure 2.1 we illustrate the shape of the optimal buy and sell boundaries
over the 10-year investment horizon, for both bull and bear markets, with dierent
position limits. The results are consistent with our Theorem 2.2 above. Note that
both buy and sell boundaries are relatively independent of time t, except when t
approaches the investment horizon T . This is due to the technical requirement by
which the investor liquidates all her portfolio positions at t = T .
We consider now the optimal investment policy of an investor who only has
access to partial information and who is subject to transaction costs. Similar to
the case with full information, the state space (z; p; t) is divided into three regions:
the buy region (BR), the sell region (SR) and the no-transaction (NT) region.
The boundary between the buy region and the no-trading region is called the buy
boundary and is denoted by zb(p; t). The boundary between the sell region and
the no-trading region is called the sell boundary, and is denoted by zs(p; t).
Theorem 2.3. Let 
 = (a; a) [0; 1] [0; T ), then under partial information and
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Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
in the presence of transaction costs, the buy and sell regions are given by,
BR 

(z; p; t) 2 
; (1 + )z
1 + z
 E   r
2
+
















Proof. It is quite similar to that for Theorem 2.2. We skip the detail here. In
this case, the inequality corresponding to (2.27) involves the term (1 )pVp

which
can be positive or negative and thus cannot be dropped. Although we cannot
get a similar bound for the optimal boundaries through the inequality, we can
characterize the trading region by (2.28) and (2.29).
Note that, when  = 1 (the log utility case), we can further transform the
problem with partial information and with transaction costs into a double obstacle
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problem, following the approach developed in Dai and Yi (2009), and then take
advantage of the theory of the obstacle problem to further characterize the optimal
buy and sell boundaries for this case. In Theorem 2.4 below, we summarize the
rened theoretical results for the log utility case.
Theorem 2.4. Let z(p) = E r
2
be the optimal fraction invested in stock when
information is incomplete and there are no transaction costs, as in Theorem 2.1.
In the log utility case, we have that
zs(p; t)  zb(p; t); (2.30)
















1 + (1  z(p)) ; a

; (2.32)
















1  (1  z(p)) ; a

; (2.34)
where both boundaries are increasing w.r.t. the conditional probability of being in
a bull market (p).
In order to prove Theorem 2.4, we rst reduce Problem (2.17) with  = 1 into
a double obstacle problem by employing the transformation:
u(z; p; t) = Vz(z; p; t):





 ut   L2u; u  1+z	 ; u+ 1 z	 = 0;
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z2(1  z)2uzz + 1
2
p
2upp + pz(1  z)upz
+

E   r + 2   32z

z(1  z)uz
+ [ (1 + 2)p+ 2 + p(1  z)  pz]up
+

(E   r)(1  2z)  2z(2  3z)

u  2z + E   r:
(2.36)
The discontinuity of the terminal condition at z = 0 and the lack in the mono-
tonicity in the terminal condition bring some diculty to fully characterize the
optimal boundaries zb(p; t) and zs(p; t). Thanks to the Fichera criteria, we are able
to deal with the problem in fz < 0g and fz > 0g independently, with no boundary
condition required at z = 0, and in both domains we can change the variable so as
to simplify the dierential operation.
In fz > 0g half plane, we let w = 1 z
z
and W (w; p; t) =  z2u(z; p; t) + z, then
w 2 (  1;1), and it follows that8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 Wt   L3W = 0; if 1w+1+ < W < 1w+1  ;
 Wt   L3W  0; if W = 1w+1  ;
 Wt   L3W  0; if W = 1w+1+ ;
W (w; p; T ) = 1
w+1  ; w 2 (  1;1):
(2.37)
In fz < 0g half plane, we instead let  = z 1
z
and U(; p; t) = z2u(z; p; t)  z, then
 2 (1 + ;1), and it follows that8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 Ut   L3U = 0; if 1 1+ < U < 1 1  ;
 Ut   L3U  0; if U = 1 1+ ;
 Ut   L3U  0; if U = 1 1  ;
U(; p; T ) = 1









Wpp   pwWwp + (22   E + r)wWw
 (p + (1 + 2)p  2)Wp + (2   E + r)W:
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For convenience, we dene

+ = (  1;1) [0; 1]; 
  = (1 + ;1) [0; 1]:
We also dene SR+, BR+, NT+ as the counterparts of SR\fz > 0g, BR\fz > 0g,
NT \ fz > 0g, by the transformation w = 1 z
z
and SR , BR , NT  as the




Before we start to prove Theorem 2.4, we rst need to provide some useful
auxiliary results.
Lemma 2.5. Let W (w; p; t) be the solution to Problem (2.37), then
Ww +W
2  0 in 
+  [0; T ]; (2.39)
Wp  0 in 
+  [0; T ]; (2.40)
Wt  0 in 
+  [0; T ]: (2.41)
Proof. The above inequalities can be proved by applying comparison principle to
Equation (2.37). For brevity we skip the details.
Lemma 2.6. There are two functions wb(p; t) : [0; 1]  [0; T ) ! [   1;+1] and
ws(p; t) : [0; 1] [0; T )! [  1;+1] such that
BR+ = f(w; p; t) 2 
+  [0; T ) : w  wb(p; t)g;
SR+ = f(w; p; t) 2 
+  [0; T ) : w  ws(p; t)g:
wb(p; t) and ws(p; t) are decreasing w.r.t. probability of a bull market (p) and
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increasing w.r.t. time (t), respectively. Moreover,
wb(p; t) > ws(p; t) for all p and t; (2.42)
wb(p; t)  (1 + )1  z
(p)
z(p)
; if z(p) > 0; (2.43)
wb(p; t) =1; if z(p)  0; (2.44)
ws(p; t)  (1  )1  z
(p)
z(p)
; if z(p) > 0; (2.45)
ws(p; T
 ) = (1  )1  z
(p)
z(p)
; if z(p) > 0; (2.46)
ws(p; T
 ) =1; if z(p)  0; (2.47)
ws(p; t) > 0; if 1   r   2 < 0: (2.48)




w + 1 + 
) = Ww +
1
(w + 1 + )2
 Ww +W 2  0:
Thus, if (w1; p; t) 2 BR+, for any w2 > w1, we have
0  W (w2; p; t)  1
w2 + 1 + 
 W (w1; p; t)  1
w1 + 1 + 
= 0
which implies that W (w2; p; t) =
1
w2+1+
, i.e., (w2; p; t) 2 BR+. Then the existence
of wb(p; t) as a single-valued function dened in [0; 1] [0; T ) follows.
To prove the existence of ws(p; t), we considerfW (w; p; t) = (w+1 )2W (w; p; t).
@
@w
[fW   (w + 1  )] =2(w + 1  )W + (w + 1  )2Ww   1
=  ((w + 1  )W   1)2 + (w + 1  )2(Ww +W 2)
0:
The last inequality is due to (2.39). Thus, if (w1; p; t) 2 SR+, for any w2 < w1, we
have
0  fW (w2; p; t)  (w2 + 1  )  fW (w1; p; t)  (w1 + 1  ) = 0
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which implies that W (w2; p; t) =
1
w2+1  , i.e., (w2; p; t) 2 SR+. The existence of
ws(p; t) as a single value function follows.
Inequality (2.42) is clear because SR+ \BR+ = ;.




w + 1 + 
=
1 + 
(w + 1 + )3
[(E   r)w   (1 + )(2   E + r)]:
(2.49)
If z(p) > 0, (2.49) yields (2.43).
If z(p) < 0, (2.49) yields w  (1 + )( 1
z(p)   1) <  (1 + ): Recall that
we always assume  +  > 0 and hence have w >    1 >  (1 + ). Thus
BR+ \ fz(p) < 0g = ;, which implies (2.44).




w + 1  
=
1  
(w + 1  )3 [(E   r)w   (1  )(
2   E + r)]:
(2.50)
Thus, (2.50) yields that w  (1   )1 z(p)
z(p) if z
(p) > 0, which implies (2.45).
Besides, it is worth pointing out that (2.50) is true for all (w; p; t) 2 
+  [0; T ]
provided z(p)  0.
If the equation in Problem (2.37) is true when t = T , then
0  Wt(w; p; T ) = 1  
(w + 1  )3 [(E   r)w   (1  )(
2   E + r)] (2.51)




(p) > 0 which, together with (2.45), implies (2.46).
If z(p) < 0, (2.51) yields w  (   1)( 1
z(p)   1) <    1, which implies that
NT+ \ ft = Tg \ fz(p)g = ;, combining that with (2.44) we obtain (2.47).
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In order to obtain (2.48), we let w ! 0 in Problem (2.37) to get8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 Wt(0; p; t)  L4W (0; p; t) = 0; if 11+ < W < 11  ;
 Wt(0; p; t)  L4W (0; p; t)  0; if W = 11  ;
 Wt(0; p; t)  L4W (0; p; t)  0; if W = 11+ ;
W (0; p; T ) = 1
1  ; w 2 (  1;1);
(2.52)




Wpp(0; p; t) (p+(1+2)p 2)Wp(0; p; t)+(2 E+
r)W (0; p; t). If 1   r   2  0, 2   E + r  0 for all p 2 [0; 1], it can be shown
that Problem (2.52) has a unique solution W (0; p; t) = 1
1  , which implies (2.48).




w + 1 + 
)  0:
For any t xed, dene w0 = wb(p0; t), then from the denition of wb(p; t) we have




; w  w0;
> 1
w+1+
; w < w0:
Therefore,
W (w; p; t) =
1
w + 1 + 
; p > p0; w > w0
which means that wb(p; t) < wb(p0; t) for p > p0, hence wb(p; t) is decreasing w.r.t.
p. In a similar way, we can show that ws(p; t) is decreasing w.r.t. p. By virtue
of (2.41), we similarly prove that wb(p; t) and ws(p; t) are increasing w.r.t time
(t).
With a similar argument, Also we obtain the corresponding lemma for z < 0,
which is given by Lemma 2.7.
Lemma 2.7. There are two functions b(p; t) : [0; 1]  [0; T ) ! [1 + ;1] and
s(p; t) : [0; 1] [0; T )! [1 + ;+1] such that
BR  = f(; p; t) 2 
   [0; T ] :   b(p; t)g;
SR  = f(; p; t) 2 
   [0; T ] :   s(p; t)g:
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Both b(p; t) and s(p; t) are increasing w.r.t. p and t respectively. Moreover,
s(p; t) > b(p; t) for all p and t; (2.53)
b(p; t)  (1 + )z
(p)  1
z(p)
; if z(p) < 0; (2.54)
b(p; T
 ) = (1 + )
z(p)  1
z(p)
; if z(p) < 0; (2.55)
b(p; T
 ) =1; if z(p) > 0; (2.56)
s(p; t)  (1  )z
(p)  1
z(p)
; if z(p) < 0; (2.57)
s(p; t) =1; if z(p) > 0: (2.58)
Thanks to Lemma 2.6 and Lemma 2.7, now we can move to the proof for
Theorem 2.4.
Proof. From the Lemma 2.6 and 2.7, we see that
SR \ fz > 0g = f(z; p; t) 2 
 [0; T ) : z  1
ws(p; t) + 1
; z > 0g; (2.59)
SR \ fz < 0g = f(z; p; t) 2 
 [0; T ) : z  1
1  s(p; t) ; z < 0g: (2.60)





cannot have non-zero value at the same point (p; t). Assume there exists (p0; t0)
such that 1
1 s(p0;t0) < 0 and
1
ws(p0;t0)+1
> 0, then we have
u(z; p0; t0) =
 
1  z ; if
1
1  s(p0; t0) < z < 0
and
u(z; p0; t0) >
 
1  z ; if 0 < z <
1
ws(p0; t0) + 1
:
Then,
u(0 ; p0; t0) =  : (2.61)
In what follows, we show
u(0+; p0; t0) >  : (2.62)
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Observe that, when z > 0,
@
@z




[(w + 1  )2(W (w; p; t)  1
w + 1  )]
=   @
@z




[fW   (w + 1  )]  0:
(2.63)
We obtain the last inequality from the Proof of Lemma 2.6. According to our
assumption,
(1  z)2(u(z; p; t) + 
1  z ) > 0; if 0 < z <
1
ws(p0; t0) + 1
:
Let z ! 0+, we get (2.62).




upp + [ (1 + 2)p+ 2 + p]up + (E   r)u
and let z ! 0+ and z ! 0 , respectively, in Problem (2.35), to nd that8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
 uit   L0ui = E   r if    < ui < ;
 uit   L0ui  0 if ui =  ;
 uit   L0ui  0 if ui = ;
ui(p; T ) =
8<:  if i = 2;  if i = 1:
Applying the maximum principle, we get u1(p; t)  u2(p; t), which is a contradiction
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From (2.59) and (2.60), we obtain
SR = f(z; p; t) 2 
 [0; T ] : z  zs(p; t)g:









 )  0; if z(p)  0
respectively. On the other hand, zs(p; T
 ) < 0 contradicts v(z; p; T ) = 
1+z
if
z < 0. Thus (2.34) yields as a result.
Since ws(p; t) is decreasing and s(p; t) is increasing w.r.t. p, from the denition
of zs(p; t) we can easily check that zs(p; t) is increasing w.r.t. p. Observe that both
ws(p; t) and us(p; t) are increasing w.r.t. t, we nd zs(p; t) is increasing w.r.t. t
when zs(p; t) =
1




Through a similar argument, we can prove the existence and properties of
zb(p; t). Finally, (2.30) is easy to obtain by use of (2.42) and (2.53).
Theorem 2.4 shows that the buy boundary is negative if the expected risk
premium, calculated based on the current probability of being in a bull market,
is negative, and the sell boundary is positive if the expected risk premium for the
stock is positive. Note also that, the investor is likely to increase her portfolio
holdings in stock when the probability of being in a bull market increases.
In order to better understand Theorems 2.3 and 2.4, we numerically compute
the optimal trading boundaries. We show that zb(p; :) and zs(p; :) are practically
independent of t, except when t approaches T . In Figure 2.2, we plot the optimal
buy and sell boundaries against the probability of being in a bull market (p), at
some xed time t  T .
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Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
In Figure 2.3 we show how the investor's optimal strategy changes for dierent
transaction cost rates, under incomplete information. Not surprisingly, the no-
trading region shrinks, and the investor trades more frequently, as the trading
charge decreases.
2.2.3 Trend Following and Contrarian Trading
In this sub-section, we would like to highlight that, investing under partial informa-
tion may lead to the adoption of trend following trading strategies, by which one
buys high to eventually sell higher, or sells low to buy lower, even when short-selling
and leverage are not allowed. As we describe in more detail below, a suciently
high risk aversion investor can combine both contrarian and trend following in her
optimal trading style.
When the stock market is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion with
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Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
constant investment opportunities, it is already well understood that an investor's
optimal policy is contrarian (buy low and sell high), assuming that short-selling
and borrowing are not allowed, and assuming the investor is risk averse (e.g. Mer-
ton (1969, 1971)). However, when investment opportunities are time-varying, an
investor with full information is likely to buildup her portfolio position in risky
asset when the state of the market turns bullish, and she is likely to unwind or
even short the risky holdings when the state of the market turns bearish. This is
exactly what happens in a model like the one suggested by Jang, Koo, Liu, and
Loewenstein (2007). However, they do not explore the trend following characteris-
tics of their trading strategy. In their model, when the regime switch occurs (and
only at that time), the investor follows a trend following trading strategy by which
she purchases more shares of stock when its price rises (a switch from bear to bull
occurs), and she sells shares of stock when its price drops (a switch from bull to
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bear occurs). However, in their model, which assumes the investor has access to
full information about the state of the market regime, the investor acts as a con-
trarian within either of the market regimes (assuming short-selling and leverage are
not allowed). In other words, under full information, trend following trading only
happens at the regime switching time. Within each market regime, the investor is
a contrarian just as in in Merton (1969).
In this sub-section, we explore the case in which the investor cannot fully ob-
serve the state of the current regime. In such framework, we have shown in Figure
2.2 and 2.3 that the investor would increase her proportion of wealth in risky stock
as the probability of being in a bull market (p) increases. In addition, from Equa-
tions (2.10) and (2.11), we nd that the probability of being in a bull market (p)
generally increases (decreases) as the stock price increases (decreases) but we will
show later that it may sometimes move in an opposite direction. As a result, start-
ing from a position located in the no-trading region, an increase in the stock price
can push the investor into the buy or the sell regions, in particular if the investor
is very risk averse. Below, we describe this in more detail.
We start by presenting in Table 2.1 the results we obtain from running 5,000
simulations of our model. In particular, we document the average number of trades
that are trend-following and contrarian, as we increase the risk aversion parameter
of the investor. To run these simulations, we assume that the initial regime is
bullish and the investor starts the investment period with a fraction invested in
stock that is equal to the no-transaction-cost optimal. These results also assume
no short-selling and no leverage.
Note that, under incomplete information, the investor is mostly a trend-following
trader who buys on the upswings and sells on the downswings. For risk aversion
values below 5, the average amount of contrarian trades is less than 2% of the
amount of trend-following trades. However, when the risk aversion parameter
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Table 2.1: Simulation of Trend-Following and Contrarian Trades
Risk Aversion () 2 3 4 5 6
Trend-Following 15.2800 51.6644 62.0216 87.7160 96.1082
Contrarian 0.5352 0.5496 0.6998 4.0186 9.8460
Parameter Values: r = 0:05, 1 = 0:165, 2 =  0:1435,  = 0:1487, 1 = 0:2353,
2 = 1:7391,  =  = 0:01, and T = 10.
takes a value of 6, for instance, the amount of contrarian trades is 10% of the
amount of trend-following trades. Hence, as risk aversion increases, the investor
is more likely to combine trend-following and contrarian trades in her investment
strategy. For low values of risk aversion, the investor is almost exclusively a trend
follower. This pattern can more formally be derived from the following analysis.
Rearranging Equations (2.10) and (2.11), we obtain that









which tells us that, in general, as stock prices increase, the probability of being
in a bull market also increases, and the investor will buildup her position in risky
asset as this probability (p) increases. This is typical of a trend follower. However,
as we have documented in Table 2.1, a more risk averse investor can also adopt
a contrarian strategy under incomplete information. This is more likely to be the
case when p is close enough to 1. From the expression above, as pt gets close
enough to 1, the parameter p tends to zero, and dpt turns negative because the
term  1dt is large relative to the remaining terms in the expression. As a result,
when the probability of being in a bull market is found to be high, the investor is
likely to decrease it (independently of whether the stock price is going up or down)
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to hedge against the possibility of a (non-observed) switch to a bear market. In this
case, the investor is likely to sell shares of the risky stock when its price goes up,
which would be classied as a contrarian trade. This case occurs when the current
probability of being in a bull market (p) is high enough and the sell boundary is
well bellow 1. In our simulation results, we nd more contrarian trades for high
risk aversion, which is when the no-trading boundaries are well below 1.
However, even when the probability of being in a bull market is low, contrarian
trading is likely to happen just because the no-trading boundaries are atter as
risk aversion increases. This source of contrarian trades is generally dominated by
the one described above.
For illustration, we represent in Figure 2.4 the no-trading bounds derived from
the partial information model for dierent values of risk aversion for the investor.





































Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
In conclusion, under partial information, it is likely that the investor will engage
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in trend following trading, by buying stock when its price goes up and by selling
stock when its price goes down. However, the investor is very likely to fail to
identify the actual state of the market that is in place. In Figure 2.5 we provide
an illustration of how likely it is that the investor will fail to identify the actual
market regime that is in place. Note how the investor is obtaining large (small)
estimates of the probability of being in a bull market when the regime in actually
bearish (bullish).

































Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
Such misestimation of the actual regime is very likely to happen in reality,
and it may lead the investors to signicant losses on their trading activity. One
should therefore expect the investor to act more cautiously when she is given only
partial information about the state of the market regime. We explore this question
further in the following section, in particular when we describe the reason for why
incomplete information increases the eect of trading costs on liquidity premia.
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2.3 Liquidity Premia and Partial Information
In a regime-switching model with complete information, in which the investor
is not allowed to short the risky asset, Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007)
show that transaction costs can have a rst-order eect on liquidity premia. They
build on Constantinides (1986) and dene liquidity premium to be the maximum
expected return that an investor is willing to give up in both bull and bear regimes
in exchange for zero transaction costs. In this sub-section we perform a similar
exercise.
For comparability, we impose a short-selling restriction on our investor. For
simplicity, when starting her investment period at time t = 0, with initial regime
i, our investor with partial access to information about the market regime, is given
a probability pi, which we assume to be the correct one at time zero, i.e. p1 = 1
and p2 = 0. In other words, when computing the investor's utility loss due to
transaction costs and partial information, we only consider the loss accumulated
after time t = 0. Let (x; y; i; t;1; 2; ; ), dened by expression 2.4 above, be the
value function of our investor in a regime-switching model with full information,
in which the expected returns in bull and bear markets are given by 1 and 2,
respectively, and the transaction cost rates are given by  and , for purchases and
sales, respectively. In addition, let  (x; y; p; t;1; 2; ; ), as dened by expression
2.12 above, be the value function of our investor when she has only access to
partial information about the state of the market. Following Jang, Koo, Liu, and
Loewenstein (2007) and Constantinides (1986), we dene the liquidity premium as
follows:
Denition 2.3.1. Let i denote the liquidity premium in regime i 2 f1; 2g when
information is complete, and let i denote the liquidity premium in regime i 2
f1; 2g when information is incomplete. These will be such that they will solve the
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following equations, i.e.,
(1  Zi ; Zi ; i; 0;1; 2; ; ) = (1  Zi ; Zi ; i; 0;1  i; 2  i; 0; 0)
and
 (1  zi ; zi ; pi; 0;1; 2; ; ) =  (1  zi ; zi ; pi; 0;1   i; 2   i; 0; 0)
where Zi and z

i = z
(pi; 0) denote the investment policies that the investor nds
optimal under no transaction costs.















In Table 2.2, we show how the liquidity premium to transaction cost (LPTC)
ratios and the optimal no-transaction boundaries, in both models with full and
partial information, change with parameter values. Note that the buy and sell
boundaries are pretty much independent of time, except when the investor is close
enough to the end of the investment period. In Table 2.2 we only provide the no-
trading boundaries at t = 0. In the partial information case, the boundaries vary
across the probability of being in a bull market, but we only show the boundaries
at p = 1. The variables Zb(1; 0) and Zs(1; 0) in Table 2.2 are the buy and sell
boundaries in a bull market, for the model with full information, while zb(1; 0) and
zs(1; 0) are the buy and sell boundaries in the bull market (p = 1) for the model
with partial information. Note that, because the expected return of a bear market
is negative, and no short-selling is allowed, the buy and sell boundaries in that
market regime would be at at 0, specially for the full information case.
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Table 2.2: Optimal Policies and Liquidity Premia
Panel A: Full Information
Zb(1; 0) Zs(1; 0) 1= 2= =
Baseline 2:07 3:01 0:7447 0:8474 0:7569
1
1:05 2.19 3.24 0.7857 0.888 0.7979
0:95 1.94 2.77 0.7078 0.8114 0.7201

1:05 1.9 2.7 0.7165 0.82 0.7288
0:95 2.25 3.36 0.778 0.8795 0.7901
1
1:05 2.06 3 0.7675 0.8704 0.7803
0:95 2.07 3.01 0.723 0.825 0.7346

1:05 1.99 2.84 0.728 0.8314 0.7403
0:95 2.15 3.19 0.7645 0.8665 0.7767
 = 
1:05 2.06 3.01 0.741 0.8432 0.7532
0:95 2.08 3 0.75 0.8528 0.7623
Panel B: Partial Information
zb(1; 0) zs(1; 0) 1= 2= =
Baseline 1.59 2.7 0.9749 1.1185 0.9920
1
1:05 1.8 2.92 1.0381 1.1859 1.0557
0:95 1.53 2.49 0.9154 1.0563 0.9322

1:05 1.52 2.44 0.898 1.0395 0.9149
0:95 1.82 3.02 1.0586 1.204 1.0759
1
1:05 1.64 2.7 1.0063 1.1492 1.0241
0:95 1.68 2.71 0.9442 1.0869 0.9605

1:05 1.58 2.56 0.9687 1.1118 0.9858
0:95 1.74 2.87 0.9827 1.1257 0.9997
 = 
1:05 1.65 2.7 0.9519 1.0928 0.9687
0:95 1.68 2.71 0.9991 1.1452 1.0165
The baseline parameters values: r = 0:05, 1 = 0:165, 2 =  0:1435,  = 0:1487,
1 = 0:2353, 2 = 1:7391,  = 2,  =  = 0:01, and T = 10.
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Note that the LPTC ratios under partial information are generally larger than
in the full information case. We have assumed in both the partial and in the full in-
formation models that the investment opportunity sets (the bull and bear regimes)
are signicantly dierent from each other. We assume up and down markets with
constant volatility across markets, while Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007)
assume constant expected returns but dierent volatilities across markets. This
could be the reason why we obtain a much larger LPTC ratio in the full informa-
tion case than in the original model of Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007).1
In Table 2.2 we can see that, in general, as the dierence between expected
returns across bull and bear regimes increases, both models with full and partial
information produce larger liquidity premia. Moreover, the larger the frequency
of switches from bull to bear markets (1), the larger the liquidity premia in both
models. As the volatility () increases,2 the liquidity premia in both models de-
crease. When the investor's risk aversion increases, the liquidity premium decreases
slightly in both models.
In order to better understand the mechanism behind these results, we perform
a number of exercises which we present next.
In Figure 2.6, we show that an investor with full information is likely to pay
more transaction costs (as a proportion of initial wealth) during the investment
period, especially for lower values of the volatility parameter.
To complement the graphical results of Figure 2.6, we simulate our models with
full and partial information and provide the outcome of that exercise in Table 2.3.
We would like to highlight that, in the full information case, a very large fraction
1 Moreover, the investor in Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007) has an innite horizon
and cares about intermediate consumption, while in our paper we focus only on the utility derived
from terminal wealth over a nite horizon of 10 years.
2 We need to assume constant volatility across regimes so that we can apply the lter in
Wonham (1965).
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Figure 2.6: The Expected Discounted Transaction Cost Bill for Dierent Volatility





























Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
of transaction costs is paid when regime switches occur (ratio at switch). In the
event of a regime switch, and given the large dierence between the two investment
opportunity sets in our market, and investor with full information is induced to
dramatically adjust her portfolio and trade a great deal of her stock holdings. In
contrast, an investor with partial information, who does not know whether a regime
switch has happened or not, does not immediately adjust her portfolio accordingly.
As a result, an investor who is given only partial information about the state of
the market, pays a smaller transaction cost bill overall. In fact, this investor is less
likely to trade in general under incomplete information.
In Figure 2.7, we compare the LPTC ratios across the two models given dierent
volatility values. Together with the results we presented in Table 2.3, it becomes
clear that, the large liquidity premia in Figure 2.7, for the partial information
model, are not the result of a large transaction cost bill. Note that the LPTC
ratios are larger for the partial information case compared to the full information
case, especially for smaller values of the volatility parameter. These results suggest
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Table 2.3: Simulation Results
Panel A: Full Information
 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
No. 188.38 176.26 165.84 155.74 145.51 135.33 125.27 113.77
No. at switch 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11 4.11
PVTC 1.08 0.71 0.5 0.36 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.14
ratio at switch 0.48 0.51 0.54 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.65
Panel B: Partial Information
 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
No. 119.89 111.03 102.48 92.70 80.90 76.75 72.66 73.70
No. at switch 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
PVTC 0.23 0.15 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03
ratio at switch 0.0014 0.0013 0.0013 0.0012 0.0012 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010
No.: total number of trades executed during the investment period; No. at switch: the
number of trades executed when the market regime switches occur; PVTC : the
discounted transaction costs paid as a percentage of the initial wealth; ratio at switch:
the fraction of the discounted transaction costs that is paid because of regime switches
Parameters values: r = 0:05, 1 = 0:165, 2 =  0:1435,  = 0:1487, 1 = 0:2353,
2 = 1:7391,  =  = 0:01,  = 2, and T = 10.
that the magnitude of the liquidity premia in the partial information case might
be due to signicantly more suboptimal investment policies, when compared to the
no-transaction-cost optimal.
In Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007) it is shown that, when there are
two fully-observable regimes with dierent volatilities across regimes, transaction
costs can have a large eect on liquidity premia mainly because of higher frequency
2.3 Liquidity Premia and Partial Information 44
Figure 2.7: LPTC Ratio for Dierent Volatility















Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
of trading created by time variation in the investment opportunity set. In their
model, the amount of trading induced by the fully-observable regime shifts leads
to a large transaction cost bill, which in turn translates into large liquidity premia.
However, in the partial information case, which we focus on in this paper, the
transaction cost bill is generally light, compared to the full information case.
In order to conrm that the large liquidity premia we obtain in a partial in-
formation model are due to a signicantly more suboptimal investment policy,
we compare the optimal investment policies with and without transaction costs.
Figures 2.8 illustrates this exercise.
Note that, in the model with constant investment opportunities (top graph
in Figure 2.8), like the one rst suggested by Constantinides (1986), the intro-
duction of transaction costs does not impact the optimal investment policy very
dramatically.3 As a result, the utility derived from the model of Constantinides
3 In the rst graph of Figure 2.8, the investment opportunity set is represented by a constant







2.3 Liquidity Premia and Partial Information 45
Figure 2.8: Optimal Policies with and without Trading Costs




























Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
(1986) does not dier much from the utility derived from the model of of Mer-
ton (1969). Merton (1969) assumes a constant investment opportunity set and
no trading costs, which results in an optimal investment policy that is constant.
Therefore, in a model with constant investment opportunities, transaction costs
have only a second-order eect on liquidity premia.
In a regime-switching model with complete information (the middle graph in
Figure 2.8), the optimal policies with and without trading costs also do not dier
signicantly. In a bear market, because we imposed a short-selling restriction, the
optimal policies with and without trading costs both imply a zero allocation to the
risky asset. Within each market regime, the optimal investment policies behave
just like in the model of Constantinides (1986). In a model with fully-observable
regime switches, like the model in Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007), it
is evident that the transaction cost bill will be heavy, especially at the regime
switching times. This conrms what we have discussed above.
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In a model with regime shifts and incomplete information (the bottom graph in
Figure 2.8), note that the investor is very likely to misestimate the actual regimes.
As a result, this investor will need to hedge against the extra uncertainty created
by the fact she does not know in which regime she is living in. In order to avoid
engaging in wasteful trades due to mistakes in the estimation of the actual regimes,
the investor also generally trades less (and smaller quantities) compared to the full
information model. All that said, it is the adoption of a suboptimal strategy to
control for trading costs, and not the frequency and amount of trading, the main
driver of the large liquidity premia in a partial information model. Therefore, the
mechanism that drives the results in our model is very dierent from that in the
paper by Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007).
Note that in a fully observable regime-switching model, the investor trades more
frequently and pays more transaction costs, but at the same time requires a lower
liquidity premium for trading an illiquid risky security. This could be consistent
with the idea that, an investor with complete information is better at timing the
market and is therefore willing to trade more and pay extra trading costs, as she
should expect a better portfolio performance on average.
Next, we extend some of the comparative statics we presented in Table 2.2. In
particular, in Table 2.2 we documented the eects associated with changes in the
expected return in a bull market. In Figure 2.9, we show how the LPTC ratios
change as a function of the expected return in a bear market.
In our baseline model, we assume that short-selling is not allowed. As a re-
sult of such restriction, and assuming full information, the investor is expected to
completely get o of the stock market and invest her entire portfolio in the bank
account when the stock market is bearish. We could easily observe that from the
middle graph in Figure 2.8. This means that, if we further decrease the expected
return in bear markets, the optimal investment policy under full information is
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Figure 2.9: LPTC Ratio against Expected Returns in Bear Market














Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
expected to remain pretty much unchanged. However, that is not the case in a
model with partial information. In this case, the investor can still hold positive
holdings on the stock when the market is bearish. As a result, the liquidity pre-
mium can increase for lower expected returns in bear markets, as we show in Figure
2.9. Despite its short life (0.58 years on average for our baseline model), a down
trend can signicantly aect the LPTC ratios under incomplete information, even
when we impose a short-selling constraint on the risky asset. The baseline value
that we use for the expected return in a down market is 2 =  0:1435, which we
extract from the estimations in Ang and Bekaert (2002). Note in Figure 2.9 that
the LPTC ratio can increase well above 1 when we decrease the expected return
in down markets below our baseline value.
In Figure 2.10, we study the eect of the duration of down markets on the
liquidity premia. Note that the LPTC ratio is sensitive to changes in the duration of
the bear market (or changes in the switching intensity parameter 2) under partial
information, but remains almost unchanged under full information. Increasing the
duration of the bear market from 7 months to 1 year leads to an increase in the
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LPTC ratio from 1 to nearly 1.4, while it stays roughly level in the full information
case.
Figure 2.10: LPTC Ratio against Duration of Bear Markets














Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
The average length of a single run in regime i is 1=i years. If we decrease the
switching intensity 2, we expect a bear market to last longer on average. In a
model with full information, a decrease in 2 leads the investor to trade less. We
have shown in Table 2.3 that, under full information, over half of the transaction
cost bill is paid at the regime switching times. Therefore, it is not surprising that
in the full information model the LPTC ratio decreases as the duration of the bear
regime increases.
In contrast, under incomplete information, an increase in the duration of bear
markets increases the LPTC ratio instead. That is the case because, as the duration
of the bear market increases, the investor is expected to make more signicant
adjustments to the probability of being in a bull market (p). The sub-optimal
investment policy under transaction costs is likely to deviate even further from the
no-transaction-cost optimal, driving up the LPTC ratio.
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In Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007) it is shown that the LPTC ratio
decreases with the transaction cost rate, in a model with full information. We show
that this is also the case in a model with partial information. In Figure 2.11, we
show that for a (round-trip) transaction cost rate of 2%, the LPTC ratio is roughly
the same for both models with full and partial information.
Figure 2.11: LPTC Ratio against Transaction Cost Rate













Parameter values: r = 0:05; 1 = 0:165; 2 =  0:1435;  = 0:1487; 1 = 0:2353; 2 =
1:7391;  =  = 0:01;  = 2.
However, as we decrease the transaction cost rate, the LPTC ratio increases for
both models, but at a much faster rate for the model with partial information. For
instance, for a (round-trip) transaction cost rate of 0.25%, the LPTC ratio in the
full information case is about 0.90. However, in the partial information case, for a
trading cost rate of 0.25%, the LPTC ratio is equal to 1.80, about two times that
in the full information case. These results suggest that when an investor is given
only partial information about the state of the stock market regime, the magnitude
of the eect of transaction costs on liquidity premia can be amplied signicantly.
We have also computed the LPTC ratio for dierent values of the risk aversion
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parameter, in both models. We nd that the LPTC ratio is not very sensitive to
changes in risk aversion, for both models.4
4 For brevity, we do not report these results in the paper. They are available from the authors
upon request.
Chapter3
Illiquid Housing Investment and
Voluntary Retirement
Housing and retirement decisions are among the most important lifetime invest-
ment and consumption decisions. However, no existing literature has considered
this joint decision. In this chapter we study the optimal joint decision of an in-
vestor on housing, consumption of a perishable good, investment in the nancial
market and retirement.
3.1 Model Setup
Suppose the investor can invest her nancial wealth in two assets. The rst one is
a bond growing at a constant risk-free rate r according to the process dRt = rRtdt.
The second one is a risky stock whose price, denoted by St; evolves according to
the following dynamics:
dSt = StSdt+ StSdBSt (3.1)
where S and S are the constant expected return rate and volatility respectively,
BSt is a one dimensional standard Brownian motion. We assume no transaction
51
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cost is incurred for trading either stock or bond.
Besides nancial assets, for many investors the housing investment is quite
important in their portfolio. In our model of Chapter 3 the investor can also invest
in housing asset whose time t price per unit, denoted by Ht, is governed by
dHt = HHtdt+HtHdBHt (3.2)
where H and H are constants, BHt is another one dimensional standard Brownian
motion. We set the correlation between the stock price and house price at .
The housing asset diers from the nancial assets. Usually it not only serves
as an investment vehicle, but also provides the investor with housing services.
Specically our investor derives utility from consuming the numeraire good as
well as the housing services. Also compared to the nancial assets, the housing
investment is often highly illiquid. We assume a proportional transaction cost 
must be paid by the seller when the house is sold. Moreover, houses are indivisible
and thus the investor must sell the current house before buying a new one.
We also assume the investor can adjust her retirement time in response to the
performance of her investment in the nancial market and housing market. Before
retirement the investor receives stochastic labor income that is perfectly correlated
1 with the risky stock:
dyt = yytdt+ yytdBSt: (3.3)
Following Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992), we further assume perfectly pos-
itive correlation given that unanticipated wage increases are likely to occur in fa-
vorable stock market climates. If, as appears to be the case, wages are less volatile
than stock prices, then 0 < y=S < 1. At any time t, the investor's current net
wealth is determined by her past investment in nancial market and real estate
1 We need to assume perfect correlation between labor income and stock price so that we are
easier to nd a suitable initial guess when we solve the HJB equation before retirement. We leave
the case with imperfect correlation as a future research topic
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market. In addition, she possesses wealth in the form of her human capital. This
human capital embodies the present value of her future labor income, which is
given by (see Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992) and Dybvig and Liu (2010))
HC(yt) =
yt
r   y + y=s(s   r) : (3.4)
The investor's problem is to maximize her discounted expected utility from
consuming a numeraire good Ct and housing services Kt (Kt is the time-t units of
housing services). We assume that the investor's preferences over the two type of
consumption are presented by the Cobb-Douglas utility function, which takes the






where  measures the importance of housing services versus numeraire good con-
sumption and  is the risk aversion parameter. Moreover we assume the investor






where  > 1.
Suppose the investor changes his house at time tj; j = 1; 2; :::; and let Ft to be
the nancial wealth, total in stock and bond.
During (tj 1; tj),
dFt = [rFt   Ct + t(S   r) + (1  It)yt]dt+ tSdBSt; (3.5)
dKt =  Ktdt; (3.6)
where t is the dollar amount invested in stock,  represents the depreciation rate
of house and It is adapted nondecreasing retirement indicator. Specically, It = 1
indicates retirement and It = 0 represents working.
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At tj,
Ftj = Ftj  + (1  )HtjKtj   HtjKtj ; (3.7)
Ktj+ = Ktj : (3.8)
A proportional transaction cost  is paid by the investor when the house is sold.
Given initial nancial wealth F0 = f , initial house price H0 = h, initial house
sizeK0 = k, initial yearly income from working y0 = y, and initial retirement status
I0  = i, the investor's objective is to choose Ct; t; tj; Ktj and It so as to maximize
the expected utility of lifetime numeraire good and housing-service consumptionZ 1
0
exp( t) [(1  It)u1(Ct; Kt) + Itu2(Ct; Kt)] dt; (3.9)
subject to labor income process before retirement (3.3), house and nancial wealth
processes (3.2) and (3.5){(3.8), as well as house-no-short-selling constraint
Kt > 0 (3.10)
and no-borrowing-without-repayment constraint
Ft + (1  )HtKt   (1  It)HC(yt): (3.11)
3.2 Optimal Strategy after Retirement
Our rst objective in this chapter is to examine how the transaction cost of housing
asset and the investor's preference over numeraire good consumption and hous-
ing services aect her housing choice, numeraire good consumption and nancial
investment strategy. For simplicity, let us rst consider the case with initial re-
tirement status I0 = 1. In this case, the investor receives no salary and chooses
optimal consumption, housing and investment strategy to maximize the expected
utility. In the following subsection, we rst consider a special case in which  = 1,
3.2 Optimal Strategy after Retirement 55
or equivalently the housing asset serves only as an investment vehicle. The math-
ematical model for  = 1 will provide us with hint to simplify the problem with
 < 1. Also the theoretical results for  = 0 help us to verify the correctness and
eectiveness of our model and numerical algorithm.
3.2.1 Housing Asset Only as an Investment Vehicle
When  = 1, the investor does not derive utility from housing services. The
problem is simplied to a portfolio selection problem of an investor who trades a
risk-free asset, a liquid risky asset (stock), and an illiquid risky asset (house) that is
subject to no-short-selling constraint and proportional transaction costs for selling
and that requires the investor to sell the current holding before purchase. In this
case, we do not need to distinguish between unit price and size of the house. We
can dene the market value of existing house by Et = HtKt. From equation (3.2)
and (3.6), we nd that
dEt = (H   )Et + HEtdBHt: (3.12)
At a house changing date tj,
Ftj = Ftj  + (1  )Etj    Etj ; (3.13)
Etj+ = Etj : (3.14)
Given initial nancial wealth F0 = f , initial house value E0 = e the investor's
objective is to choose Ct; t; tj and Etj so as to maximize the expected utility of





subject to processes (3.5), (3.12), (3.13), (3.14), the solvency constraint
Ft + (1  )Et  0: (3.15)
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We can dene the value function by







1   dt; (3.16)























(f + (1  )e  ; )	 = 0; f + (1  )e > 0; e > 0 (3.17)
where  is the value of new house after purchase, which satises 0 <  < f+(1 )e

.
This is a two dimensional problem. We can simplify it by using the homogeneity
of value function to reduce one dimension in state space and solve it numerically.
When there are no transaction costs (i.e.,  = 0), we can nd the explicit solution,
which we will present in the following.
As in Merton's model where transaction costs are absent, we deneWt = Ft+Et
be the time t net wealth, which satises the following SDE
dWt = [rWt   Ct + t(S   r) + Et(H   r)] dt+ tSdBSt + EtHdBHt: (3.18)
In this case, Et becomes a control variable. Given initial net wealth W0 = w, we








1   dt; (3.19)
subject to wealth process (3.18), solvency constraint Wt  0; 8t  0.
When the housing asset is in the unconstrained case (i.e., Et can be any real
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In the real world houses are prevented from short-selling. we summarize the results
in the following theorem.

























































; H  0:
This is actually the well-known Merton's result, where the only dierence lies
in the constraint at the control variable Et  0. With position limits, Dai, Jin and
Liu (2011) also gave the explicit optimal strategy when there were no transaction
costs. Just in their paper, the investor is choosing optimal policy to maximize the
terminal wealth while our investor is maximizing the intermediate consumption.
We present the proof briey below:
Proof. Dene the house-value-net-wealth ratio, H = Et=Wt and the fraction of
net wealth allocated to stock, s. It is not hard to shown that value function (w)
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1  A = 0
and
C = Aw:
For a given H , we can rst nd the non-constraint maximizer s, which is
given by
s =
s   r   HsH
2s

















1  A = 0:
By applying the properties of quadratic function, we nally nd out A, H , 

s and
nish the proof for Theorem 3.1.
In general, the expected return of the housing price is smaller compared to that
of stock. Moreover holding a house is subjected to the depreciation cost. Thus
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the resulting expected growth rate of the market value of the existing house is
usually smaller than the risk-free interest rate, as the default parameter values we
use. Theorem 3.1 implies that in this case the investor, who does not derive utility
from the housing services, is optimal not to invest in the housing asset if its price
is positively correlated with the stock price.
However for many investors, a house is an important asset in their portfolio
because they also want to enjoy the housing services. In the following we move
to the case in which the investor derives utility from consuming a numeraire good
and the housing services, i.e.  < 1.
3.2.2 Housing Asset as Investment Vehicle and Consump-
tion
When the investor derives utility from the unit of housing services (i.e.,  < 1), we
can not combine the price per unit of the house and its size together as what we
do for  = 1. We dene the value function by (f; k; h), which depends on initial
nancial wealth F0 = f , initial unit housing price K0 = k and initial house size
H0 = h:












(f+(1 )hk h; ; h)g = 0; f+(1 )kh > 0; k > 0 (3.22)
where  is the size of the new house, which satises the inequality 0 <  < f+(1 )kh
h










2hh + Hshfh + (rf   C + (s   r))f
+ Hhh   kk   + u2(C; k)

:
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Similar to the case with  = 1, we can nd the closed form solution when there
is no transaction cost (i.e.,  = 0). Besides the net wealth, we need one more state
variable in this case. Given initial net wealth W0 = w and initial housing price
H0 = h, we dene the value function by









1   dt; (3.23)
subject to the wealth process (3.18), the housing price process (3.2) and the sol-
vency constraintWt  0; 8t  0. The closed form solution is given in the following
theorem.
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(1  )[(1  )(1  ) + 1]2H
  H(1  ) = 0:
(3.24)
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Let  = 1, the optimal strategies in Theorem 3.2 are reduced to that in Theorem
3.1 in last sub-section. When  < 1, the algebra equation used to determine the
constant and optimal housing strategy becomes complex and thus it gets dicult
to nd an explicit solution as that with  = 1.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3.1. We present it briey below:
Proof. Dene the house-value-net-wealth ratio, H = Et=Wt and the fraction of
net wealth allocated to stock, s. The corresponding HJB equation for the value
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1     H(1  ) +
1
2
2H(1  )(1 + (1  )(1  )) = 0;
where c = C
w
. For each given H  0, we can nd a particular s and c  0 to
maximize the function in the left side of the above algebra equation. Inserting the
resulting expression of s and c we change the above algebra equation into (3.24).
Once we nd the optimal ?H through Equation (3.24), we can nd optimal s and
c, which are the maximizers corresponding to ?H .
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Now we go back to the transaction cost case. The associate equation is given by
(3.22), which is a three dimensional variational inequality. Inspired by the model
with  = 1, we simplify it by introducing the market value of existing house e = kh.
Dene
(f; k; h) = h (1 )(1 )U(f; e): (3.26)
To show U(f; e) satises a simplied two-dimensional equation, we only need to
concern about the consumption term and obstacle term. It can be checked that














U(f + (1  )e  ; )

:
Thus U(f; e) satises the following equation
minf L2U;U   sup

U(f + (1  )e  ; )g = 0; f + (1  )e > 0; e > 0 (3.27)
where  becomes the house value after purchase, which satises 0 <  < f+(1 )e
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2Uff + HseUef + (s   r   Hs(1  )(1  ))Uf

:
Let  = 1, Problem (3.27) is reduced to Problem (3.17) in last sub-section.
From operator L2, we nd that the investor, who derives utility from size of housing
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services, is equivalent to derive utility from the market value of the house just by
changing the expected return of housing price and the stock price as well as the
discounted factor. As a result, with the homogeneity of the utility function it is
not hard to show U(f; e) is concave in (f; e) and homogeneous of degree 1    in
(f; e). Specically we nd
U(f; e) = 1 U(f; e); 8  > 0;
which implies that














Making use of (3.28), we can do the following transformation to reduce Problem
(3.27) into a one-dimensional problem. Dene
U(f; e) =
(e+ f)1 




The governing equation for u(z) is given by
minf L4u; u  sup

u()  log(1  z)g = 0; 0 < z < 1

(3.30)
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Here  is the fraction of net wealth (bonds, stocks and house) invested in stock
and c is the consumption rate normalized by the net wealth.
Analyzing Equation (3.30), we nd the following proposition, which is similar
to the result in Dai, Liu and Zhong (2012).
Proposition 3.2.1. Assume HJB equation (3.30) admits a solution, then,
i) the solution is not unique;
ii) there exists a minimum solution to HJB equation (3.30).
Proof. Suppose u1(z) is a solution to HJB equation (3.30). We aim to prove that
given 8M > sup
z
u1(z), if u2 satises the following equation:
minf L4u2; u2  M   log(1  z)g = 0; (3.31)
then sup
z
u2(z) = M , or equivalently, u2 is also a solution to HJB equation (3.30).
Assume N = sup
z































On the other hand u1 is a solution to HJB equation (3.30), which implies that
(f; h; k) = h(1 )(1 )
(f + hk)1 




where (f; h; k) is the original value function given by (3.21). Obviously f (f; k; h) 
0 from the denition of  for the dynamics are linear. Thus we can conclude that
1  zu01  0;
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 0; for  6= 1:
Thanks to this inequality we can apply comparison principle to variational inequal-
ity (3.31) and (3.32) to conclude that
u2(z)  u1(z) N +M:




On the other hand, as a solution to (3.31),
sup
z
u2  u2(0) M: (3.34)
Combining (3.33) and (3.34) together we nd that sup
z
u2 =M and nish the proof
for part i). Now let us move to the prove for part ii). Dene
M = inffsup
z
u(z); u(z) is a solution to (3.30)g:
Then for 8  > 0, there exists u(z), which is a solution to (3.30) such that
M +  > sup
z
u. Suppose u is a solution to the following equation,
minf L4u; u M   log(1  z)g = 0:





u  M + . Due to the arbitrary of , sup
z
u  M and thus u(z)
is the minimum solution to HJB equation (3.30).
Following the algorithm given by Dai, Liu and Zhong (2012), we numerically
solve Equation (3.30) as follows.
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The algorithm of nding the solution numerically:
1. Set initial guess M0;
2. Given Mi, use penalty method with nite dierence scheme to solve







4. If jMi+1  Mij < tolerance then stop; otherwise go to Step 2.
Proposition 3.2.2. Suppose u(z) is the minimum solution to Equation (3.30),
M0 < sup
z
u(z) and Mi is given in the above algorithm. Then









Proof. Given Mi, solve
minf L4u; u Mi   log(1  z)g = 0; 0 < z < 1

:
Clearly u(0)  Mi. Thus Mi+1 = supu  u(0)  Mi, which also implies that the
second equality if lim
i!1
Mi exists.
3.2.3 Numerical Results after Retirement
We present numerical results after retirement in this sub-section. The default
parameter values are set based on Yao and Zhang (2005): r =  = 0:02; H =
0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  = 0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 1:5;  = 0:06
and  = 0:01.
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Figure 3.1: Value Function after Retirement
















Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 0:06 and  = 0:01.
After retirement the investor chooses the optimal policy so as to maximize her
consumption of good and housing services. Figure 3.1 shows that there exists an
optimal house-value-net-wealth ratio z > 0, at which the investor's value function
obtains its maximum. We assume no transaction cost occurs when purchasing
house and thus the investor can move from a at position in housing to the optimal
level z without any cost. Obviously u(0) = u(z), which is consistent with what
we nd in Figure 3.1. Also we nd that there exist zb < z
 and zs > z such that
when z  zb and z  zs, u(z) = u(z) + log(1   z). This implies that in those
two regions the investor is optimal to sell the current house and buy a new one
such that the new house-value-net-wealth ratio reaches the optimal level. In the
region z  zb (z  zs), the investor is increasing (decreasing )the house-value-net-
wealth ratio so we call it buy (sell) region. Within the domain between zb and zs,
the investor is optimal not to change her house size, we call it house-no-trading
region. zb, the boundary between buy and house-no-trading region is buy boundary
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whereas zs, the boundary between sell and no-trading region is sell boundary.
Figure 3.2 shows the optimal trading strategy with dierent proportional trans-
action cost rates. We nd that the house-no-trading region becomes wider and
wider as  increases. The intuition behind this result is that an increase in trans-
action cost makes the investor lower the buy boundary and increase the sell bound-
ary to reduce transaction cost payment. According to Theorem 3.1 and 3.2, the
investor keeps trading to maintain an optimal house-value-net-wealth ratio when
there is no transaction cost. From Figure 3.2 we see that as transaction cost rate
approaches 0, the optimal fraction z, buy boundary zb and sell boundary zs will
combine at the same point. This particular point turns out to be the optimal
house-value-net-wealth ratio without transaction cost.
Figure 3.2: No-trading Region for Housing with Dierent TC
















Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 0:01.
When the investor focuses primarily on liquid nancial assets, Merton (1971)
concluded that the investor is optimal to keep a constant fraction of the portfolio
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value invested in stock. Figure 3.3 and 3.4 display how the investor's housing
choice within the no-trading region aects her investment in nancial assets and
numerical good consumption for dierent correlation coecient between the house
price and the stock price.
Figure 3.3: Investment in Stock within House-no-trading Region

























Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:06;  = 3;  = 0:01.
From the left chart in Figure 3.3 we nd that the proportion of net wealth
(bonds, stocks and house) invested in stock is U-shaped in house-value-net-wealth
ratio when the correlation is small, whereas stock-net-wealth ratio declines as
house-value-net-wealth increases when the correlation gets big. This nding im-
plies that when the investor purchases a house with size smaller than the optimal
level but not small enough, she will keep the house size unchanged and increase her
dollar amount in stock. However, when the new house with size much bigger than
the desirable level but not big enough to push her to change a smaller one, the
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investor will behave dierently when faced with dierent correlations between the
stock price and the house price. Specically when the correlation is small, given
this set of parameter values such that the Sharpe ratio of stock is much higher
compared to that of house asset, the investor will increase her funds in stock when
the new house size is found to be big for the benet of diversication. In contrast,
as the correlation gets large, the diversication benet shrinks and so the investor
will reduce her funds in stock when the house size is larger than the desirable
level. The right chart in Figure 3.3 shows that stock-house-value ratio declines as
house-value-net-wealth (bonds, stocks and house) ratio increases within the house-
no-trading region. Intuitively, as stock price decreases in the house-no-trading
region, the investor will reduce her funds invested in the risky stock. Moreover,
the investor tends to invest less in stock as correlation increases.
From the left chart Figure 3.4, we nd that the good-consumption-net-wealth
ratio increases a bit near the buy boundary, then declines as house-value-net-wealth
ratio increases and nally increases a bit again near the sell boundary. The strategy
near trading boundary helps to push the house-value-net-wealth ratio back to the
optimal level and avoid the large transaction cost paid when it hits the trading
boundary. The right chart in Figure 3.4 shows that as stock price decreases in the
house-no-trading region, the investor will reduce her good consumption.
With the default parameters, Theorem 3.1 shows that if the investor holds the
housing asset just for investment (i.e.,  = 1), then the investor is optimal not to
hold a house when without transaction cost. The intuition is that the expected
return of the house price is usually much lower compared to that of stock and
furthermore the existing house is subjected to the depreciation cost, which can
make the growth rate of the house market value even smaller that the risk-free
interest rate. Thus the investor is optimal to choose only stock and bank account
as the investment instruments. However, the existing house also provides living
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Figure 3.4: Numeraire Good Consumption within House-no-trading Region


































Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:06;  = 3;  = 0:01.
services. And dierent investors may have dierent preferences for housing services
versus the numeraire good. In the following we examine the eect of the housing
preference 1   on the investor's optimal policy. From Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4,
we nd that both the consumption rate and the fraction of portfolio invested in
stock change as the current house-value-net-wealth changes. For illustration we
present those results at optimal state z = z in Table 3.1. We dene c and 
as the optimal consumption rate normalized by the net wealth (bonds, stocks and
house) and optimal stock-value-net-wealth ratio at z = z.
Table 3.1 shows that when  = 1, the investor is optimal to invest only in stock
and bank account given the default parameter values, which is equivalent to the
Merton's strategy for an investor who only focuses on nancial wealth. c = 0:0218
and  = 0:2705 are consistent to the explicit Merton's strategy, given in Theorem
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Table 3.1: Optimal Housing Policy with Dierent Housing Preference
zb zs z
 c 
 = 1 0 0 0 0.0218 0.2705
 = 0:9 0.055 0.23 0.105 0.0192 0.2631
 = 0:8 0.11 0.395 0.2 0.0167 0.257
 = 0:7 0.16 0.53 0.29 0.0142 0.2493
 = 0:6 0.21 0.64 0.375 0.0118 0.242
 = 0:5 0.265 0.72 0.455 0.0095 0.2336
Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:2;  = 3;  = 1:5;  = 0:06;  = 0:01.
3.1. When the house also provides living services, the investor is optimal to hold
a house even when the growth rate of the house value is smaller than the risk-free
interest rate, i.e., H    < r. Table 3.1 also shows that the investor will consume
less numeraire good, decrease the stock holding and invest more in housing asset as
her preference for housing services, 1   , increases. Given the default parameter
values and that the investor equals the importance of housing cervices to numerarie
good consumption, i.e. 1   = 0:5, the optimal good consumption per year is less
than 1 percent of the net wealth. In this chapter we set 1   = 0:2 as the default
value, consistent with the average proportion of household housing expenditure in
the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
If the investor holds house just for investment purpose, then according to The-
orem 3.1 when there is no transaction cost the optimal fraction in house is positive
if and only if
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With transaction cost we have done lots of numerical experiments and still can not
nd a counterexample showing that this result does not hold. From Table 3.2 we
nd that when the investor also derives utility from the housing services, she is
optimal to hold a house even when the expected growth rate of the house market
value, H    is negative and the correlation  is positive.
Table 3.2: Optimal Housing Policy with Dierent House Return
zb zs z
 c 
H = 0 0.0775 0.28 0.1475 0.0178 0.2645
H = 0:01 0.095 0.3475 0.1775 0.017 0.2599
H = 0:02 0.1225 0.46 0.225 0.0164 0.2529
H = 0:03 0.1725 0.645 0.31 0.0162 0.2400
H = 0:04 0.26 0.915 0.4475 0.0169 0.2183
H = 0:05 0.385 1.29 0.625 0.019 0.1898
Parameter values:
r =  = 0:02; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  = 0:02;  = 3;  = 0:06;  = 0:01.
With H  0:03 and other default parameter values, our numerical results
indicate that the investor should not put her money in the housing market for
the purpose of investment. However considering its housing services, the investor
will reduce her investment in both stock asset and bank account and purchase a
house even though the housing preference versus numeraire good is only 20%, as
we can see from Table 3.2. An interesting point shown in Table 3.2 is that the
numeraire good consumption rstly declines and then rises as H becomes lager
and larger. When H     r, the investor holds a house just for its housing
services and has to take losses on the net wealth. In this case, as H decreases, the
investor will decrease the house size and consume more numeraire good. However
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when H    > r, the housing asset also serves as an investment vehicle. As H
increases, the total net wealth grows and as a result the investor can consume more
and more numeraire good. This case is similar to the Merton's strategy where an
increase in the expected return of nancial wealth will lead to in increase in the
numeraire good consumption.
3.3 Optimal Policy before Retirement
Now the investor's value function and the optimal strategies after retirement are
clear. We will move to the study of the investor's optimal strategy for investment,
consumption and retirement when she is on work. We dene the value function
by  (f; k; h; y), which depends on initial total nancial wealth F0 = f , initial unit
housing price K0 = k, initial house size H0 = h and initial salary y0 = y:





exp( t)(1  It)u1(Ct; Kt) + Itu2(Ct; Kt)dt:
(3.35)
Since the investor can choose any time to retire,
 (f; k; h; y)  (f; k; h);
where (f; k; h) is the value function after retirement, given by (3.21). The investor
can also choose any time to change the size of house, as a result
 (f; k; h; y)  sup

 (f + (1  )hk   h; ; h; y):
Observe that u2(c; k) > u1(c; k), or equivalently, the same consumption of the
numeraire good and the housing services generates greater utility after retirement,
the investor will retire immediately if the labor income yt  0 before retirement.
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Making use of dynamical programming principle, we nd the HJB equation for
 :
minf L1 ;    sup

 (f + (1  )hk   h; ; h; y);    (f; k; h)g = 0; (3.36)
or equivalently,
minf L1 ;   maxfsup

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:
As the case after retirement, we can also reduce one dimension by setting
 (f; k; h; y) = h (1 )(1 )V (f; e; y); e = kh:
V (f; e; y) is found to satisfy the following equation
minf L2V; V   supe V (f + (1  )e  e; e; y); V   U(f; e)g = 0; (3.37)
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3.3.1 The Investor Who Never Retires
For purpose of comparison, we consider a simplied case in this sub-section, in
which the worker will never retire. Why we consider this simplied case is also
because that the associate numerical results will provide us with a useful bound-
ary condition to solve the complex HJB equation for the case where the investor
has voluntary retirement. Without voluntary retirement, HJB equation (3.37) is
reduced to
minf L2V; V   sup

V (f + (1  )e  ; ; y)g = 0: (3.38)
Luckily we can change it to a one dimension problem by setting
V (f; e; y) =
(e+ f +HC(y))1 




It is not hard to show that v0(z) satises Equation (3.30). Just in this case  is
replaced by 1 and , c and  have dierent meanings.
Remark 3.3.1. It should be understood that HC(y) is the present value of the
investor's future wage income under the hypothesis that she will never retire. That
is, it is as if the individual realized 100% of her potential labor income. In eect,
one can think of the investor as transforming her maximum potential human capital
into nancial wealth and basing her portfolio investment and expenditures on this.
In mathematics, we can write down dynamics of the sum of the nancial wealth
and the potential human capital in the following:
d(Ft +HC(yt)) =r(Ft +HC(yt))dt  Ctdt















The investor who never retires thus will adopt the optimal investment and con-
sumption strategies similar to that for those who have retired. The only dierence
is that the investor who has retired makes her decision based only on her current
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net wealth (bonds, stocks and house) however the investor who never retires will
count her potential human capital in her current net wealth.
3.3.2 The Investor with Voluntary Retirement
Now we go back to the general case where the investor receives the stochastic
salary through working and is able to decide the retirement date. With the ex-
tra constraint V (f; e; y)  U(f; e) we can not reduce Problem (3.37) into a one-
dimensional problem. However we can introduce the following transformation to
reduce Problem (3.37) by one dimension:
V (f; e; y) =
(f + e+HC(y))1 








where HC(y) is the human capital given by (3.4). In the following we call f + e+
HC(y) as the investor's total wealth and f + e as the investor's net wealth. It can
be shown that v(x; z) satises the following two-dimensional problem
min
n
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where u is the associate value function after retirement, given by (3.29), and
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Remark 3.3.2. Similar to Proposition 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the solution to the above
two dimensional problem is not unique. Given the minimum solution to Problem
(3.30), u(z), we will solve the problem by making use of an iteration algorithm
similar to that for solving equation after retirement.
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Remark 3.3.3. The problem before retirement is a two dimension problem, in
order to solve which, we need some boundary conditions. We can impose sell
condition on z big enough and buy condition on z small enough, i.e., let




1  z ; )
when z is either big or small. When x = 0, we can use upwind scheme and no
boundary condition is required. When x is big enough, the investor is equivalent
to one who never retires. So we let v(x; z) = v0(z) when x is big enough, where
v0(z) is given by sub-section 3.3.1.
3.3.3 Numerical Results before Retirement
We present the numerical results before retirement in this section. The default
parameter values used are as that after retirement. For any given x, we nd
from our numerical results that there exists z(x) > 0 at which v(x; ) obtains its
maximum value. We call z(x) the optimal fraction in housing asset.
For later use we give the denition for house-buying region, house-selling region
and house-no-trading region respectively
HBR = f(x; z) : v(x; z) = v(z(x)) + log(1  z); z < z(x)g ;
HSR = f(x; z) : v(x; z) = v(z(x)) + log(1  z); z > z(x)g ;
HNTR = f(x; z) : v(x; z) > v(z(x)) + log(1  z)g :
The retirement region and working region are given in the following respectively:
RR =

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Further we dene W&B, W&S and W&NTR to beWR\HBR;WR\HSR and
WR \HNTR respectively and R&B, R&S and R&NTR to be RR \HBR;RR \
HSR and RR \HNTR.
Figure 3.5 shows that for each given house-value-net-wealth (bonds, stocks and
house) ratio, there exists a human-capital-total-wealth (net wealth and human
capital) ratio boundary, green line in Figure 3.5, such that on the left to which
is the retirement region whereas on the right to which is the working region. We
call the green line as retirement boundary. From Figure 3.5, we also nd that
for each given human-capital-total-wealth ratio, there exists an optimal level for
house-value-net-wealth ratio, the red solid line in Figure 3.5. The investor adjusts
her house size only when the house-value-net-wealth ratio deviates substantially
from the optimal level. There exist a sell boundary and a buy boundary (the
upper and the lower black dashed lines as shown in Figure 3.5), when the house-
value-net-wealth ratio hits either of which, the investor sells the current house and
buys a new one such that the new house-value-net-wealth ratio reaches the optimal
level. Obviously, after retirement the investor's housing strategy is independent of
her labor income if she works. Before retirement, the investor tends to purchase
a bigger house as her salary increases. Given the default parameter values, we
nd that when the investor's human capital, the current value of future labor
income, is four or more times of her net wealth, she is optimal to short the liquid
nancial assets and purchase a big house with market value even more than her
current net wealth. At the retirement date the investor's optimal house-value-
net-wealth ratio as well as the house-no-trading region jumps down signicantly.
Because the retirement is irreversible and the investor receives no labor income
since retirement, she optimally purchases a smaller house to ensure a continuous
numeraire good consumption.
The optimal proportion of net wealth invested in the risky stock is shown in
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Figure 3.5: Optimal Retirement and Housing Boundaries


















Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 1:5;  = 0:06;  = 0:01; y = 0:01 and y = 0.
Figure 3.6. Given a xed human-capital-total-wealth ratio, the investor's stock-
value-net-wealth ratio is a U-shaped in the house-value-net-wealth ratio. This is
consistent with what we nd in the section after retirement for small correlation
between the house price and the stock price. After retirement, the investor's stock-
value-net-wealth ratio is only dependent of the house-value-net-wealth ratio but
independent of the labor income, whereas before retirement it is increasing as the
human-capital-net-wealth ratio increases. At the retirement date, the proportion
of net wealth in the stock together with the house-no-trading region shifts down
greatly. Intuitively, the investor will reduce her risk exposure after retirement.
The numeraire good consumption rate to net wealth ratio is shown in Figure 3.7.
Given a xed human-capital-total-wealth ratio, the investor's good-consumption-
net-wealth ratio generally decreases as the house-value-net-wealth ratio increases
within the house-no-trading region except when it approaches the house-trading
boundaries. Similar to the proportion of net wealth invested in stock, we also
nd that after retirement, the investor's good-consumption-net-wealth ratio is only
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Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 1:5;  = 0:06;  = 0:01; y = 0:01 and y = 0.
dependent of house-value-net-wealth ratio but independent of the labor income,
whereas before retirement it is increasing as the human-capital-net-wealth ratio
increases. At the retirement date, the good consumption rate also declines greatly.
Intuitively, the investor becomes more risk averse after retirement and as a result
she will reduce her risk exposure, purchase a smaller house, decrease her good
consumption and put more money in the bank account.
So far we have shown that there exists a human-capital-total-wealth (bonds,
stocks and human capital) ratio bellow which the investor is optimal to retire.
In the following we study some factors aect the investor's retirement decision
and how they aect it. Figure 3.8 and 3.9 show the investor's optimal retirement
choice as a function of the investor's nancial-wealth-house-value ratio, F=E, and
the investor's yearly salary to house value ratio, y=E. The lines in Figure 3.8
and 3.9 represent the retirement boundary for dierent sets of parameter values.
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Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 1:5;  = 0:06;  = 0:01; y = 0:01 and y = 0.
Above those lines are the retire regions and below those lines are the working
regions. We nd that an investor will optimally retire if her current yearly salary
is small enough compared to the existing house value. Moreover, as her current
nancial wealth increases the investor also tends to retire. Intuitively, a decrease
in the investor's yearly salary and an increase in the stock price both are possible
to lead the investor to retire earlier.  represents the investor's preference for
retirement versus working. Given the same salary-house-value ratio, the investor
with a greater  is more likely to retire. For example Figure 3.8 shows that given
y = 0:5% and y=E = 1%, the investor with  = 1:5 will choose to retire if her
nancial wealth is more than half of her current house value; whereas the investor
with  = 1:2 may continue to work until her nancial wealth increase to 2:5 times
of the current house value. Moreover with the same retirement preference and the
same salary volatility, Figure 3.8 illustrates that the investor with a smaller salary
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growth rate will retire earlier. While from Figure 3.9 we nd that given the same
retirement preference and the same salary growth rate, an increase in the salary
volatility will also lead the investor to retire earlier.
Figure 3.8: Optimal Retirement Choice and Salary Growth Rate

















Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 1:5;  = 0:06;  = 0:01 and y = 0.
Figure 3.9: Optimal Retirement Choice and Volatility of Salary

















Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 0:05;  = 0:01 and y = 0:01 and y = 0:01.
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Finally we check the eect of the growth rate and volatility of the labor in-
come on the investor's housing investment. Figure 3.10 shows the optimal house-
value-net-wealth (bonds, stocks and house) ratio against the salary-net-wealth ratio
within the working region (In the retirement region, housing choice is independent
of the investor's salary if she works). Here the optimal ratio is the target level
that the investor hopes to obtain after purchasing a new house. We nd that the
investor will put more money in the housing market if the growth rate of her salary
becomes lager or the volatility of her salary becomes smaller. In fact, our numerical
results show that the entire house-no-trading region shifts up as the salary growth
rate increases and the salary volatility decreases (gure not shown). Intuitively the
investor is optimal to purchase a bigger house if her labor income is more stable
or grows faster.
Figure 3.10: Optimal Housing Policy and Parameter of Salary


















Parameter values: r =  = 0:02; H = 0:015; H = 0:1; s = 0:04; s = 0:157;  =
0:8;  = 0:2;  = 3;  = 1:5;  = 0:06;  = 0:01.
Chapter4
Superhedging Problem under Ratio
Constraints
If the market is arbitrage-free, complete and unconstrained, the option pricing
problem is fully understood. However in the real nancial market, the seller of
option generally could not leverage or trade as many shares of underlyings as
she likes, which would bring some diculties into the pricing problem. In the
following, we will study the superhedging problem under ratio constraints. Firstly
we will formulate the problem as the BSDE with general constraints as in Peng
(1999). Then we will present some sucient conditions for the existence of the
upper price and the smallest superhedging strategy. After that we will study
the European vanilla option under the constant and time-varying constraint. We
rst present the variational inequality for the upper price and then study the
superhedging problem through the double obstacle problem, which is equivalent to
the variational inequality and easy to investigate. Also the constrained arithmetic
Asian call options with oating and xed strike will be considered. The method of
studying the equivalent double obstacle problem is shown to be quite eective for
the path-dependent options.
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4.1 Superhedging with ratio constraints
4.1.1 The Financial Model
We consider a nancial market, which contains a riskfree asset (bank account) and
a risky asset (stock). Their prices B and S are governed by following equations
dBt =rtBtdt; B0 = s;
dSt =St[(bt   qt)dt+ tdWt]; S0 = x:
(4.1)
Here rt > 0 is the riskless rate, bt, qt and t are the expected rate of return,
dividend of the stock and the volatility matrix of the stock, respectively, all of
which are deterministic. We set t, s, x > 0 and bt > rt. Here Wt is a standard one
dimensional Brownian motion, dened on a probability space (
;F ;P). P is said
to be the 'objective' probability measure. The information structure is given by a
right-continuous ltration (Ft : 0  t  T ), where (Ft) is the -algebra generated




and we name it as risk premium of the market. Under these assumptions
we know that the market is dynamically complete. In the following, we will use
the idea of superhedging from El Karoui and Quenez (1995) and El Karoui, Peng
and Quenez (1997) to study the pricing problem with hedging constraints in such
market.
Let us consider a small investor whose actions cannot aect the assets' prices in
the market and who can decide at time t 2 [0; T ] the amount t of the wealth Vt to
invest in the risky asset, and his consumption Ct. His decision can only be based
on the current information (Ft), i.e., the processes t and Vt   t are predictable.




csds is the cumulative amount of consumption from 0 to t. Here it is
not necessary to be absolutely continuous. In some cases it can be interpreted as
the liquidity necessary under some constraints. We call such a strategy (V; ; C)
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self-nancing if the wealth process Vt satises the equality









or equivalently, if the wealth process satises the linear stochastic dierential equa-
tion
dVt = rtVtdt  dCt + tt[dWt + tdt];
Let  be a positive contingent claim, which is settled at time T , is an FT -
measurable random variable. It can be regarded as a nancial target of the investor,
or a contract which pays  at maturity T .
Denition 4.1.1. (i) A superhedging strategy against  is a feasible self-nancing
strategy (V; ; C) such that VT = . We denote by H() the class of superhedging
strategies against . If H() is nonempty,  is called superhedgeable.
(ii) The upper price X0 (or upper initial invest X0) at time 0 of the superhedgeable
claim  is the smallest initial endowment needed to hedge , i.e.,
X0 = inffx  0; 9(V; ; C) 2 H() such that V0 = xg:
And the corresponding self-nancing strategy (V; ; C), if it exists, is called the
smallest superhedging strategy.
In the following we assume   0. To price the contingent claim  is to nd the
upper price X0 at time 0 by superhedging, which is called as the selling price in El
Karoui and Quenez (1995). When there is no (portfolio) constraint in the market,
we must have Ct = 0. Recall that when the market is complete, the upper price is
given by
Vt = EQ[e
  R Tt rsdsjFt]; Ct = 0; (4.2)
where EQ[] is the risk-neutral probability measure with Radon-Nikodyn derivative
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Usually in the market, there are some constraints for the hedging portfolio,
such as prohibition of short selling or prohibition of borrowing too extensively. In
mathematics,  is usually required to take values in a given convex set (see Cvitanic
Karatzas and Soner (1998)). An incomplete market can also be considered as a
market with constraints (see El Karoui and Quenez (1995)). In this paper we
consider a kind of portfolio constraints, the ratio constraint, which is given in the
following
Problem 4.1.1.  Ratio constraint: The investor is required to keep his money
invested in the risky asset under certain percentage t of the total wealth,
i.e., jtj  tVt.
 General form: the constraint can be formed as tVt  '(t), where ' is a
Lipschitz function with '(0) = 0.
This constraint has practical meaning. For example Basel agreement for banks
requires the bank to preserve 8% capital not investing in the risky assets. In this
case we set t  0:92. And nowadays, some exchanges use ratio premium system,
which also ts our constraint. When the ratio premium is 20%, the ratio is set as
83.33% i.e. t  0:8333. Here the condition   1 implies borrowing is forbidden.
Since in the market no borrowing is very strong requirement, we assume t  1 in
many cases of following studies. Moreover the ratio constraint implies the wealth
process Vt  0. Here we also include the case that t  0, i.e. the investor is short
selling risky asset in the market, then the ratio constraint requires that total wealth
of the investor can cover a percentage of his short selling risky asset. Meanwhile,
when t  0, the ratio constraint implies that the money that investor can only
put into risky asset is controlled by a certain percent of his total wealth.
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4.1.2 BSDEs with Ratio Constraints: General results
To nd the upper price of a constrained contingent claim , one useful mathematical
tool is BSDE with constraints. In this subsection we study such kind of BSDEs and
present an existence result for the upper price and smallest superstratege. Usually
we use   to denote the constraint in the market, which is a closed subset of RR.
The smallest supersolution to such an equation with terminal value  gives the
upper price of  in the constrained market. Before we introduce the denition of
the solution of BSDE with constraints, we present some notations for spaces, which
we are going to work with. Set p 2 (0;+1)
 Lp(Ft) :=fR-valued Ft{measurable random variables , s.t. E[jjp] <1g;
 L+1(Ft) :=fR-valued Ft{measurable random variables , s.t. ess sup jj <
1g;
 LpF(0; t) :=fR{valued and Ft{progressively measurable processes ' dened




 DpF(0; t) :=fR{valued and RCLL Ft{progressively measurable processes '
dened on [0; t], s.t. E[sup0st j'sjp] <1g;
 ApF(0; t) :=fincreasing processes A in DpF(0; t) with A(0) = 0g.
The smallest solution to BSDE with constraints is dened as following (see
Cvitanic, Karatzas and Soner (1998) and Peng (1999)).
Denition 4.1.2. We call a triple of progressively measurable processes (Y; Z;C) 2
D2F(0; T )  L2F(0; T ;Rn)  A2F(0; T ) to be the smallest solution of BSDE with a
coecient g(t; y; z), a constraint   and terminal condition , if it veries
Yt =  +
Z T
t
g(s; Ys; Zs)ds+ CT   Ct  
Z T
t
ZsdWs; (Yt; Zt) 2  , dP  dt-a.s.,(4.3)
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and if there is another triple of progressively measurable processes (bY ; bZ; bC) satis-
es (4.3), then we have Yt  bYt, for t 2 [0; T ].
Under a complete market framework, we have r 2 L2F(0; T ), b;  2 L2F(0; T ) and
 2 L2F(0; T ). If the contingent claim  is superhedgable under a hedging constraint
 , then the smallest superhedging strategy is the smallest supersolution of linear
BSDE with coecient g(t; y; z) =  (rty + tz) and constraint (Yt; Zt) 2  , i.e.
(V; ; C) = (Y; Z=;C). In fact, if there is no constraint, then Ct  0 and (Y; Z) is
the solution of BSDE,













tdWt]), we know that Yt =
E[XT e
  R Tt rsds] = Vt (the fair price given by (4.2)), which coincides with the classic
results.
Let us consider Problem 4.1.1 in the form of BSDE with ratio constraints which
was introduced in Peng and Xu (2010) as an example of BSDE with general con-
straints. In that paper, the authors gave the existence of smallest the supersolu-
tion as well as its relationship with the variational inequality under the assump-
tion that the coecient g is a Lipschitz function. In linear case, noticing that
g(t; y; z) =  (rty+ tz) satises the assumptions in Proposition 7 and Proposition
8 in Peng and Xu (2010), as direct applications, we have the following results.
Theorem 4.1.1. If  2 L2(FT ) is superhedgeable, then there exists a small-
est superhedging strategy (V; ; C) = (Y; Z=;C), where (Y; Z; C) 2 D2F(0; T ) 
L2F(0; T ) A2F(0; T ) is the smallest solution of the constrained BSDE,
Yt =   
Z T
t




tYt  ' (jZtj =t) , dP  dt-a.s..
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Moreover (Y; Z) is the limit of (Y n; Zn) in L2F(0; T )  LpF(0; T ) (p < 2), where
(Y n; Zn) is the solution of the penalization BSDE
















Theorem 4.1.2. Assume the terminal condition  2 L2(FT ) satisfying + 2
L1(FT ). Then  is superhedgeable under the constraint tYt  ' (jZtj =s), for
t  0.
However this sucient condition is quite strong, it only covers a few case like
European put option  = (K   ST )+, there are lots of contingent claims do not
satisfy this condition, like European call option  = (ST  K)+. In the following
subsection, we will discuss such case under the Markovian framework.
4.1.3 BSDE with Constraints under Markovian Framework
In this subsection, without losing generality, we assume '(x) = x. We put BSDE
with constraints (4.4) under Markovian framework by combining (4.1) and give
some new sucient condition for the existence of the smallest superhedging strat-
egy for a contingent claim . Consider the price of the risky asset with initial time
and initial price (t; x). We get the uncoupled Forward-backward BSDE with the


























Zt;xs  =s, dP  dt-a.s..
(4.5)
From Theorem 4.1.1, we know that the existence of the smallest solution to
(4.5) relies on the superhedgeable of  under the constraint sY
t;x
s  jZt;xs j =s.
Theorem 4.1.2 gives a sucient condition, which includes the put option, by the
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simple fact that  = (K ST )   K. However such condition is too strong for  in
many cases. In the following, we assume  = 	(ST ) and then relax the requirement
in Theorem 4.1.2.
Theorem 4.1.3. Assume t  1. If 	 is linear increasing in x, i.e. there exists
a constant  such that j	(x)j  (1 + jxj), then 	(ST ) is superhedgeable under
ratio constraint sY
t;x
s  jZt;xs j =s, i.e. there exists a a triple (Y ; Z; C) satises
(4.5).







0, which is a continuous process in D2F(0; T ). So 	(ST ) 2 L2(FT ). Dene b =
(1 + St;xT ) 2 L2(FT ), then we consider the following linear BSDE













Apply dual method by introducing forward SDE dXs =  rsXsds   sXsdWs,
Xt = 1, we get
Y s = X
 1





s s + Y

s s;





sdWs = (1 + S
t;x
T )XT . From
Clark-Ocone formulae, we have
Zs = X
 1
s E[Ds((1 + S
t;x
T )XT )jFs] + Y s s;
whereDs stands for the Malliavin derivative of . By Ito^ calculation and Malliavin
calculus, notice bu   ru = uu, we nally obtain that
Y s = X
 1
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Since for s  T , exp(  R T
s
rudu) > 0, with s  1, we get immediately
sY

s   1s jZs j = St;xs :
Set Ct = 1ft=Tg((1 + ST )   	(ST )), so (Y ; Z; C) is a superhedging strategy,
i.e. 	(ST ) is superhedgeable under constraint sY
t;x
s   1s jZt;xs j.
Remark 4.1.1. In fact, from the proof, we know that the assumption of t  1
is crucial under the linear increasing assumption on terminal value.
Remark 4.1.2. With this theorem, we largely extend the contingent claim we
can study comparing to Theorem 4.1.2. For example the European call option,
 = (ST  K)+.
Remark 4.1.3. If the terminal payo also depends on the stock values before
maturity such as Asian type, i.e.  = 	(
R T
0
Stdt), where 	 is a deterministic
function. Then by introducing an auxiliary process Jt =
R t
0
Ssds, we transform the
terminal condition into the form  = 	(JT ) and get a similar forward-backward
equation as (4.5), where the process J plays a similar role as S in (4.5).
Theorem 4.1.3 indicates that the smallest superhedging strategy and the upper
price of the European vanilla option under the ratio constraints exist. Remark 4.1.3
implies the existence of the smallest superhedging strategy and the upper price for
the constrained arithmetic Asian option. In the following we will study these two
types of options under the ratio constraints through the variational inequality based
on the results in Peng and Xu (2010), which considered the relation between the
variational inequality and the BSDE with general constraints. Since it is not easy
to characterize the superhedging strategy and the upper price directly from the
variational inequality, we then introduce its equivalent double obstacle problem to
fully investigate the constrained options.
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4.2 European Vanilla Option
In this section we consider the European vanilla call and put option under the ratio
constraints given by Problem 4.1.1. In this section we allow t to be time variable.
In order to avoid confusing t and its derivative, we redene t by (t). Moreover
to ensure the existence of the upper price of the constrained European vanilla call,
we will always assume t  1 for all t.
From Theorem 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 we nd that there exists a smallest solution
to BSDE (4.5), which is given by (Y t;xs ; Z
t;x
s )tsT . Dening u(t; x) = Y
t;x
t and
applying Proposition 9 in Peng and Xu (2010), we know that u(t; x) is the minimal
viscosity solution of following variational inequality
minf ut   1
2












; if x  (T )
(T ) 1K;













; if x  (T )
(T )+1
K:
for vanilla put (4.8)
It is worth pointing out that the ratio constraint given in Problem 4.1.1 becomes
 (t)  xux(t; x)
u(t; x)
 (t):
1The terminal value u(T; x) for the constrained option is the smallest function that satises
the ratio constraints at the maturity T and that dominates the nal payo of the related orig-
inal option without constraints. Without loss of generality, we assume (T ) > 1 and give the
responding terminal condition.
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 wt   L1w;w + (t)x
o
; w   (t)
x
o










; for vanilla call
1
x K Ifx< (T )K
(T )+1
g   (T )x Ifx (T )K
(T )+1
g; for vanilla put
(4.10)
where L1w = 22 x2wxx + (r   q + 2)xwx + (r   q)w + 2x(xwwx + w2) and IA is
the characteristic function.
For the purpose of comparison, we will rst assume (t) to be a constant and
then allow (t) to be time variable. In either case, we check that the double
obstacle problem (4.10) is equivalent to the variational inequality (4.6). Then we
can take advantage of the double obstacle problem (4.10) to investigate the upper
price of the constrained vanilla options.
Theorem 4.2.1. Dene u(t; x) to be the upper price of an European vanilla option
under the ratio constraint    xux(t;x)
u(t;x)
 . Assume  is a constant, then u(t; x)
is equal to the price of a related unconstrained claim, whose nal payo dominates




< ; t < T; for the constrained vanilla call (4.11)
  < xux(t; x)
u(t; x)
< 0; t < T: for the constrained vanilla put (4.12)
Proof. By simple computation, we nd that
 wt   L1w = 0; if w =  x ;
 wt   L1w = 0; if w = x :
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Thus the double obstacle problem (4.10) can be reduced to8>>>>><>>>>>:








 1g; for vanilla call
1





g: for vanilla put
(4.13)
Observing that
0 < w(T; x)  
x
; for vanilla call
 
x
 w(T; x) < 0; for vanilla put
we use the strong comparison principle to PDE (4.13) to show that
0 < w(t; x) <

x
; t < T; for vanilla call (4.14)
 
x
< w(t; x) < 0; t < T; for vanilla put (4.15)
Following the approach in Dai and Yi (2009) we nd that there exists some




satises the variational inequal-
ity (4.6) and the associated terminal condition, where x0 =
K
 1 . Thanks to the
inequalities (4.14) and (4.15), we then obtain (4.11) and (4.12) respectively. More-
over, we nd that
 ut   1
2
2x2uxx   (r   q)xux + ru = 0; t < T; x 2 R+;
which together with the associated terminal condition implies that the upper price
of the constrained call or put u(t; x) is equal to the price of a related unconstrained
claim, whose nal payo dominates the original claim.
Corollary 4.2.1. Dene u(t; x) to be the upper price of an European vanilla option
under the ratio constraint  (t)  xux(t;x)
u(t;x)
 (t). If (t) is decreasing, then u(t; x)
is equal to the price of a related unconstrained claim, whose nal payo dominates
the original claim.
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Proof. Let u(t; x) be the Black-Scholes price of an unconstrained claim, whose
nal payo is given by (4.7), associated with vanilla call. Then Theorem 4.2.1
concludes that 0 < xux(t;x)
u(t;x)
< (T ), for t < T . Since (t) is decreasing, we have
0 < xux(t;x)
u(t;x)
< (t), for t < T . As a sequence, u(t; x) satises the variational
inequality (4.6) and the terminal condition (4.7), which implies that u(t; x) is
equal to the upper price of the European vanilla call under the ratio constraint
 (t)  xux
u
 (t). The same result can be shown for the constrained vanilla
put.
In the following, we assume (t) to be increasing. Obviously we can not guar-
antee the ratio constraint is satised by just increasing the nal payo to satisfy
the ratio constraint at maturity. In Theorem 4.2.2 we will study the constrained
vanilla call option by assuming (t) to be increasing. In mathematics observing
that
 wt   L1w > 0; if w =  (t)x ;
 wt   L1w < 0; if w = (t)x ;
we can not reduce the double obstacle problem (4.10) into the PDE like (4.13),
and thus the upper price may not be written as the Black-Scholes price of the
associated unconstrained claim. However through the double obstacle problem, we
will show that for each given time t, there exists a critical boundary in terms of
x bellow which xux(t;x)
u(t;x)
, the ratio of the portfolio invested in stock, is equal to the
upper constraint (t) and above which it is not.
Theorem 4.2.2. Dene u(t; x) to be the upper price of an European vanilla call
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option under the ratio constraint  (t)  xux
u
 (t). Assume (t) to be increas-
ing, then for each time t, there exists x(t)  0 such that
0  xux(t; x)
u(t; x)
< (t); if x > x(t); (4.16)
xux(t; x)
u(t; x)
= (t); if x  x(t): (4.17)
Proof. Firstly we apply the comparison principle to the double obstacle problem
(4.10) to nd that w(t; x)  0 >  (t)
x
. Thus the double obstacle problem (4.10)
can be reduced to8><>:
max
n
 wt   L1w;w   (t)x
o
= 0; t < T; x 2 R+;
w(T; x) = 1








It can be checked that @x (xw)  0 by the comparison principle. As a consequence,
for the given t and x1 > 0 if w(t; x1) =
(t)
x1
, i.e., x1w(t; x1) = (t), then for any
x2 < x1,
(t)  x2w(t; x2)  x1w(t; x1) = (t);
from which we nd that w(t; x2) =
(t)
x2
. This indicates that for any time t, there
exists x(t) such that w(t; x) = (t)
x
if x  x(t) and 0  w(t; x) < (t)
x
if x > x(t).
Following the approach in Dai and Yi (2009), we show that there exists some
function 2(t) such that u(t; x) = 2(t)e
R x
x(t) w(t;)d; x > 0 satises the variational
inequality (4.6). Observing that w(t; x) = ux(t;x)
u(t;x)
, we nished the proof for the
existence of x(t) in Theorem 4.2.2.
For illustration, we show an example of x(t) in Figure 4.1. From the gure
we nd that at each time t, the seller of the constrained vanilla call option should
keep a fraction of (t) of the portfolio value in the stock as the stock price St = x
becomes low enough.
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Figure 4.1: Free Boundary for Vanilla Call with Time-variational Constraints

















Parameter Values: r = 5%; q = 1%;  = 30%; T = 1:5; (t) = t+ 1:5 and K = 1.
4.3 Arithmetic Asian Option
This section is devoted to the arithmetic Asian option with the ratio constraint
given by Problem 4.1.1. In this section we always assume t to be a constant
bigger than 1. For the purpose of comparison, we will consider both call options
with oating strike and xed strike. We will show that the upper price of the
constrained oating strike call is equal to the value of a related unconstrained
claim. In contrast, even under the constant ratio constraint, the upper price of the
xed strike vanilla call may not be expressed as the value of a related unconstrained
claim.
From Theorem 4.1.3 and Remark 4.1.3, we obtain the existence of the smallest
superhedging strategy and the upper price for the arithmetic Asian option under







and u(t; x; j) to be the time-t value of the constrained Asian option with the stock
price St = x and jt = j. Applying Proposition 9 in Peng and Xu (2010), we nd
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x2uxx   (r   q)xux   x  j
t
uj + ru; u  xux; u+ xuxg = 0;(4.19)
with the terminal condition2
u(T; x; j) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
(j  K)+; for the xed strike case8><>:








: if x  
 1j
for the oating strike case
(4.20)
The variational inequality (4.19) is two dimensional. Fortunately we can reduce





; for the xed strike case
tj
x
; for the oating strike case
(4.21)




v(t; y); for the xed strike case
xv(t; y): for the oating strike case
(4.22)
Then the governing equation for v(t; y) is given by
minf vt  F1v; (  1)v + yvy; ( + 1)v   yvyg = 0; (4.23)
where y 2 R for the xed strike case and y 2 R+ for the oating strike case and
F1v = vt + 
2
2
y2vyy + [1  (r   q)y]vy   qv:
The terminal condition becomes
v(T; y) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:













for the oating strike case
(4.24)
2For the case with xed strike the terminal condition u(T; x; j) is exactly the same with
the original option without constraints; for the case with oating strike the terminal condition
u(T; x; j) is the smallest function that satises the ratio constraints and that dominates the nal
payo of the original option without constraints.
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In the following we will take use the equivalence between the variation inequality
and the double obstacle problem to investigate the upper price of the constrained
arithmetic Asian call options with both oating and xed strike.
Theorem 4.3.1. Dene u(t; x; j) to be the upper price of a oating strike arith-
metic Asian call option under the ratio constraint    xux(t;x;j)
u(t;x;j)
 . Assume
 > 1, then u(t; x; j) is equal to the price of a related unconstrained claim, whose




< ; t < T: (4.25)
Proof. Taking advantage of the transformations (4.21) and (4.22) for the oating
strike case, we change the variational inequality (4.19) for u(t; x; j) into the one-
dimensional inequality (4.23) for v(t; y). Then following the approach developed










 wt  F2w;w   1 y
o
; w   1+
y
o













where F2w = 22 y2wyy + [1  (r   q   2)y]wy   (r   q)w + 2y(ywwy + w2):
The rst equation in (4.27) implies that
 wt  F2w  0; if w = 1  
y
;
 wt  F2w  0; if w = 1 + 
y
:
However a direct computation yields that
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; for t < T; (4.28)
or equivalently, 8>>>>><>>>>>:












Observing that w(T; y) < 0, we can use the comparison principle to the above PDE
to conclude that w(t; y) < 0. Thus 1 
y
< w < 0, for t < T . A similar argument
with that in Dai and Yi (2009) shows that the variational inequality (4.23) is





< 0. Moreover, we nd8>>>>><>>>>>:
















Going back to the original variable, we obtain the inequality (4.25) and the follow-
ing PDE for u(t; x; j)8>>>>><>>>>>:
 ut   22 x2uxx   (r   q)xux   x jt uj + ru = 0;
u(T; x; j) =
8><>:








; if x  
 1j
which implies that u(t; x; j) is equal to the price of a related unconstrained claim,
whose nal payo dominates the original claim.
Theorem 4.3.2. Dene u(t; x; j) to be the upper price of a xed strike arithmetic
Asian call option under the ratio constraint    xux(t;x;j)
u(t;x;j)
  and assume  > 1
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and tj > TK. Then u(t; x; j) is exactly equal to the price of the unconstrained
original claim, where K is the xed price and jt is the time t arithmetic average of
the stock price.
Proof. Given the transformations (4.21) and (4.22) for the xed strike case, we
only need to consider the one-dimensional variational inequality (4.23) for v(t; y).
Observe that the variational inequality (4.23) is degenerate at y = 0. Thanks to
the Fichera criteria for degenerate parabolic equation, we can solve the variational





; y > 0





 wt  F2w;w   1 y
o
; w   1+
y
o
= 0; t < T; y 2 R+;
w(T; y) = 1
y
:
An exactly the same argument with the proof of Theorem 4.3.1 indicates that the
double obstacle problem can be reduced to8><>:
 wt  F2w = 0; t < T; y 2 R+:
w(T; y) = 1
y
:
Again following the approach in Dai and Yi (2009), we show that the above PDE
for w(t; y) is equivalent to the variational inequality (4.23) for v(t; y), which thus
can be reduced to 8><>:
 vt  F1v = 0; t < T; y 2 R+
v(T; y) = y:
(4.29)
It implies that when y > 0, the ratio constraints (  1)v+ yvy > 0 and (+1)v 
yvy > 0 with  > 1 do not increase the upper price of the constrained claim. Finally
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going back to the original variable, we can conclude that when y = tj TK
x
> 0,
i.e., tj > TK, u(t; x; j) is exactly equal to the price of the unconstrained original
claim.
Theorem 4.3.2 indicates that the ratio constraint    xux(t;x;j)
u(t;x;j)
  with
 > 1 does not aect the value of the xed strike call if tjt, the time to current
integration of stock price, is bigger than TK, the maturity times the strike price.
The intuition is that once the current tjt dominates TK, the seller will not need to
leverage or short sell the underlying before the maturity in order to hedge the xed
strike call. In contrast, when tjt < TK the seller may need to leverage intensively
so to hedge themselves. For better illustration, we solve the associated PDE for
the unconstrained xed strike call and show the ratio of the seller's portfolio value
invested in stock in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: The Ratio of Portfolio Value Invested in Stock


























Parameter Values: r = 5%; q = 1%;  = 30%.
Figure 4.2 shows that if tj < TK and the time-t stock price x is small enough,
then the seller of the xed strike arithmetic Asian option needs to put a very high
fraction of the portfolio value in the stock, i.e., to borrow a great amount of money
from the bank and invest it in the stock. Thus if tjt < TK and the ratio constraint
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xux(t;x;j)
u(t;x;j)
  is imposed, the seller's hedging strategy and thus the upper price
of the xed strike Asian call will be greatly aected. We characterize the seller's
hedging strategy in Theorem 4.3.3.
Theorem 4.3.3. Dene u(t; x; j) to be the upper price of a xed strike arithmetic
Asian call option under the ratio constrain    xux(t;x;j)
u(t;x;j)
  and assume  > 1
and tj < TK. Then for each time t, there exists y(t)  0 such that












Moreover, y(t) is increasing and y(T ) = 0.
Proof. Through the transformations (4.21) and (4.22) for the xed strike call, we
only need to consider the one-dimensional variational inequality (4.23) for v(t; y)
with the related terminal condition given by (4.24). In Theorem 4.3.2 we have
solved the variational inequality in the domain fy > 0g, where the ratio constraints
are never biding. Now we focus on the variational inequality (4.23) in the domain
fy < 0g, where the Fichera criteria for degenerate parabolic equation fails and a
boundary condition is required at the boundary y = 0. Specically, we consider8>>>><>>>>:
minf vt  F1v; (  1)v + yvy; ( + 1)v   yvyg = 0; t < T; y 2 R ;
v(T; y) = 0;





; y < 0
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 wt  F2w;w   1+y
o
; w   1 
y
o
= 0; t < T; y 2 R ;
w(T; y) = 1 
y
;









the comparison principle to the double obstacle problem (4.32) yields that w(t; y) 
0 > 1+
y
, for y 2 R . Thus the double obstacle problem (4.32) can be reduced to8>>>><>>>>:
max
n
 wt  F2w;w   1 y
o
= 0; t < T; y 2 R ;
w(T; y) = 1 
y
;





Again applying the comparison principle we nd that @y (yw)  0. A similar proof
with that of Theorem 4.2.2 shows that for any time t, there exists y(t)  0 such
that w(t; y) = 1 
y
if y  y(t) and w(t; y) < 1 
y
if y(t) < y  0. Then following
the approach in Dai and Yi (2009), we can show that there exists some function
3(t) such that
v(t; y) = 3(t)e
R y
y(t) w(t;)d; y < 0
satises the variational inequality (4.23). Going back to the original variable, we
nished the proof of the existence of y(t).
Observing that w(t; y) obtains its maximum value at terminal T and w(t; 0)
is increasing, we apply the maximum principle and get wt(t; y)  0, which yields
the monotonicity of y(t) consequentially. Next we will prove y(T ) = 0 by
contradiction. Obviously y(T )  0. We assume y(T ) < 0, then for y > y(T )
we have






Clearly it contradicts with wt  0. We nish the proof.
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For better illustration we give the numerical results in Figure 4.3. The numer-
ical results are consistent with Theorem 4.3.3.
Figure 4.3: Free Boundary for Fixed Strike Arithmetic Asian Option




















Parameter Values:  = 1:5; r = 5%; q = 1%;  = 30%; T = 1:5.
Chapter5
Conclusion
This thesis focuses on two important topics in the eld of mathematical nance:
the portfolio selection problem and the derivative pricing. Our rst two research
problems are related to the portfolio selection under transaction costs. The rst
one assumes a non-observable bull and bear regime switching market and inves-
tigates how the incomplete information about the stock price aects its trading
and liquidity premium. The second one incorporates the illiquid housing asset and
voluntary retirement into the Merton's problem and studies the joint decision of an
investor on housing, consumption of a nondurable good, investment in the nan-
cial market, and retirement. The last research problem is devoted to the derivative
pricing under hedging constraints.
5.1 Optimal Investment with Incomplete Infor-
mation
In the rst part of this thesis, we study the optimal investment policy of an in-
vestor who trades in a market that switches stochastically between bull and bear
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regimes. The investor does not fully observe the state of the market and incurs
transaction costs. Thanks to the lter proposed in Wonham (1965) we are able to
reformulate our model as a singular stochastic control with complete information.
The resulting value function turns out to be the solution of a two-dimensional
parabolic variational inequality equation.
We show that our investor's optimal investment policy consists mostly of trend
following trading. We show that this optimal policy depends on both the current
stock price as well as on the performance of the stock over a certain lookback
period. The idea is to catch a bull market at its early stage, ride the trend, and
liquidate the position at the rst evidence of the subsequent bear market. We
synthesize in one single measure the information provided by the past stock prices.
This measure is designed in a way so as to capture the likelihood with which our
investor is living in a bull market. This measure is therefore closely related to the
past performance of the stock. When stock prices go up for a while, it is more likely
that our investor is living in a bull market. If prices have been going down instead,
then it becomes likely that the investor is living in a bear market. As a result,
our investor is likely to initiate, hold, or liquidate positions, based on the perceived
direction of the stock price trend. Therefore, our investor acts like a trend follower:
if the stock price is going to make an exceptional move in one direction or another,
it must rst make a moderate move in that direction, leading to the conclusion
that if an initiation can be made at that moderate level, the remaining portion of
the trend can be followed for a signicant period of time thereafter and liquidated
at a prot.
The distinctive features of our model, in particular the existence of up and
down market trends, and the uncertainty regarding the state of the current mar-
ket regime, allow us to improve considerably on the results obtained using the
framework in Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007). In particular, we calibrate
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our baseline model using the basic estimates for the U.S. equity market provided
in Ang and Bekaert (2002). We show that, in the baseline case, the LPTC ratio
is 30% larger in a model with time-varying investment opportunities and partial
information, compared to a similar model with full information. In addition, it is
more than six times larger than the LPTC ratio obtained in a model with constant
investment opportunities, like the one in Constantinides (1986).
We show that, when we impose short selling restrictions on the risky asset,
our model with partial information is particularly sensitive to changes in (among
other factors) the expected return and duration of bear markets, whereas the full
information model does not react much to changes in such variables. In our base-
line model, the expected return for the bear market is -14.35% (Ang and Bekaert
(2002)). If we expect the bear market to be more severe, with an expected return
of say -22%, the LPTC ratio in our model increases by about 40%. The LPTC
ratio in the full information model remains unchanged for a similar change in the
expected return in bear markets. Moreover, in our baseline model, the average
duration of the bear market is 0.58 years (Ang and Bekaert (2002)). If we increase
the average duration of the bear market to 1 year, the LPTC ratio in our model
also increases by about 40%, whereas it decreases slightly in the full information
model.
The intuition for such results is as follows. In the full information model, when
the market switches from the bull to the bear regime, an investor that is restricted
from short selling will invest her entire portfolio in the money market. This strategy
is independent of the severity of the bear market. Therefore, a change of the
bear market expected return from -14.35% to -22% does not aect the investment
policy of the investor in the full information model, and the LPTC ratio remains
unchanged. However, when the investor is given only partial information about
the state of the market, a switch from a bull to a bear regime will not be fully
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observable by the investor, who will remain invested in the stock even when it is
in a down trend. As a result, if the bear market is expected to be more severe,
a larger downward move of the stock price can lead the investor to reduce her
estimate of the likelihood that she is living in a bull market, which leads to more
selling of risky asset and larger LPTC ratios.
In a regime-switching model with full information, most of the trading happens
at the regime switching times. Therefore, if we increase the expected duration
of the bear regime (decrease its switching intensity), there will be fewer regime
switching times and therefore less trading and a lighter transaction cost bill to be
paid. However, in a model with partial information, the longer the bear market
the more the investor will reduce her estimate of the likelihood that she is living
in a bull market, which leads her to increase the amount of selling of risky asset.
As a result, the investor pays a heavier transaction cost bill, which increases the
LPTC ratio.
Generally, transaction costs decrease an investor's utility through either the
wealth that is consumed by the transaction cost bill, or the suboptimal risk ex-
posure imposed by the presence of transaction costs. The results in Dai, Li, Liu,
and Wang (2010) are shown to be due mostly to the suboptimal risk exposure
chosen by the investor to control transaction costs, while in Jang, Koo, Liu, and
Loewenstein (2007) and Lynch and Tan (2011) the results are driven mostly by the
increase in the frequency of trading induced by the time-variation in the investment
opportunity set.
We show that the main source of liquidity premia in our model is the subopti-
mal risk exposure chosen by the investor to control transaction costs. Intuitively,
uncertainty about the state of the market regimes leads our investor to increase
her hedging demands, and to refrain from trading on her potentially misestimated
probabilities of being in any particular regime. In our framework, the no-trading
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region created by the presence of transaction costs depends on the measure of the
likelihood that our investor is living in a bull market. Incomplete information leads
to a wider no-trading region for our investor's policy, which decreases the frequency
with which she trades, and which pushes her investment policy further away from
the no-transaction-cost optimal.
We show that the discounted value of the transaction costs (PVTC) incurred
in the full information model (e.g. Jang, Koo, Liu, and Loewenstein (2007)) are
much larger than in the partial information model that we propose in this paper.
Using our baseline parameter values (the estimates in Ang and Bekaert (2002)),
we show that PVTC in the partial information model is only 20% of that in the
full information model, but more than 50% larger if compared to a model with
constant investment opportunities (e.g. Constantinides (1986)). The large LPTC
ratio we obtain in the partial information model is then mainly the result of the
suboptimal risk exposure chosen by the investor to control transaction costs.
5.2 Optimal Investment with Illiquid House and
Voluntary Retirement
In the second part of this thesis, we study the optimal joint decision of a worker on
housing, consumption of a perishable good, investment in the nancial market, and
retirement. We solve and extensively analyze the tractable continuous-time model,
where changing houses can incur signicant transaction costs and the worker can
adjust her retirement time in response to the performance of her investment in the
nancial market and the real estate market. We investigate the important lifecycle
consumption and investment questions.
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In our model, the investor's consumption services are generated from the nu-
meraire good and the housing services. The housing asset is illiquid in that a
transaction cost must be paid when the house is sold. In order to investigate the
eect of the transaction cost and the investor's preference for the housing services
on her investment and consumption strategy, we rst consider an investor who has
retired. Our results indicate that there exists an optimal house-value-net-wealth
ratio. The investor will sell the existing house and buy a new one if her house-value-
net-wealth ratio deviates substantially from the optimal level. We call the region
where the house size optimally keeps unchange as the house-no-trading region. We
nd that the size of the house-no-trading region declines as the transaction cost
decreases. When the transaction cost approaches to 0, the investor optimally keeps
trading to maintain an optimal constant house-value-net-wealth ratio. Within the
house-no-trading region, the investor adjusts her numeraire good consumption and
her nancial investment so as to maximize the utility. We show that the investor
should reduce her funds invested in the risky stock and the consumption for the
numeraire good as the stock price decreases. Also we nd that the investor opti-
mally increases her funds in stock if she purchase a house whose size is smaller than
the optimal level. While if she purchases a house much bigger than the desirable
level, the investor will increase her funds in stock when the correlation coecient
between the house price and the stock price is small for the benet of diversication
whereas reduce her funds in stock when the correlation gets large due to the fact
that the diversication benet shrinks.
Our results also indicate that when the investor derives utility from the housing
services, she will optimally hold a house even when the growth rate of the house
market value is negative and her preference for the housing services is small com-
pared to that for the numeraire good. Moreover we show that the investor tends to
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consume less numeraire good, decrease the stock holding and invest more in hous-
ing asset as her preference for housing services increases. Keeping the investor's
preference for housing services unchange, we also nd that the investor will reduce
her funds in house as the housing return becomes smaller and smaller. When its
expected return is big, the house serves not only as a kind of consumption but
also as an important investment vehicle and thus a decrease in its return will lead
the investor to earn less and consequently decrease her consumption of numeraire
good. While when its expected return is small, the house serves mainly as a kind
of consumption and thus a further decrease in housing return will lead the investor
to increase her consumption of numeraire good to maintain the utility at a certain
level.
Our second and more important contribution in the second part is to investigate
what factors aect the worker's optimal time to retire, how they aect it and in
turn how the retirement aects the optimal investment and consumption. Our
results show that for each given house-value-net-wealth (bonds, stocks and house)
ratio, there exists a human-capital-total-wealth (net wealth and human capital)
threshold such that above which the investor optimally continues to work and
bellow which the investor optimally retires. The threshold is almost independent
of the existing house-value-net-wealth ratio. To better illustrate the factors that
aect the investor's retirement decision, we display the retirement choice as a
function of the nancial-wealth-house-value ratio and the yearly-salary-house-value
ratio. We nd the investor will optimally retire if her current yearly salary is small
enough compared to the existing house value. Moreover, as her current nancial
wealth increases the investor is more likely to retire. Intuitively, a decrease in the
investor's yearly salary and an increase in the stock price is possible to lead the
investor to retire. Also we nd that an investor, who prefers for the leisure life
after retirement more, will optimally retire earlier. A decrease in the growth rate
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of yearly salary and an increase in its volatility will also lead the investor to retire
earlier.
Furthermore, we examine how the investor's voluntary retirement aects her
optimal housing and investment decisions in turn. For each given human-capital-
total-wealth ratio, there exists an optimal level for the house-value-net-wealth ra-
tio. The investor adjusts her house size only when the house-value-net-wealth ratio
deviates substantially from the optimal level. This optimal ratio decreases contin-
uously as the human-capital-total-wealth ratio decreases before retirement, then
jumps down signicantly at the retirement date and nally keeps constant after
retirement. We also show the optimal proportion of net wealth (bonds, stocks and
house) invested in stocks and that for consumption. It turns out that both of them
jump down at the date of retirement. Intuitively, because retirement is irreversible
and the investor receives no more labor income from retirement, she will optimally
reduce the risk exposure, purchase a smaller house, decrease her good consumption
and put more money in the bank account after retirement. Eventually, we show
that a decrease in the growth rate of yearly salary and an increase in its volatility
will move the optimal proportion of net wealth invested in risky house together
with its no-trading region down. Intuitively, an investor optimally purchases a
smaller house if her salary is not so stable or grows slowly.
5.3 Superhedging under Ratio Constraints
The third part of this thesis focuses on the superhedging problem under ratio
constraints. Under the denition of superhedge strategy, we rst formulate the
problem as the BSDE with general constraints as in Peng (1999). Through the
BSDE method we obtain some sucient conditions for the existence of the upper
price and the smallest superhedging strategy for the contingent claims under ratio
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constraints. Then we give the variational inequality for the upper price based
on the relation between the BSDE with general constraints and the variational
inequality. Thanks to the clever approach in Dai and Yi (2009), we can investigate
the superhedging problem through the double obstacle problem, which is equivalent
to the variational inequality and much easier to investigate. Through the double
obstacle problem, it is easy to show that the upper price of the European vanilla
option under the constant ratio constraint can be simply expressed as the Black-
Scholes price of some associated unconstrained claim. This result still holds when
the ratio constraint becomes stronger and stronger as time goes by, i.e., t in
Problem 4.1.1 is decreasing. However when the ratio constraint is getting weaker,
i.e., t is increasing, the upper price may not be written as the Black-Scholes price
of some associated unconstrained claim. But through the double obstacle problem,
we can eectively characterize the seller's superhedging strategy.
Besides the European vanilla options, we can study the path-dependent options
under the ratio constraint through the equivalent double obstacle problem. The
examples discussed in this paper are the arithmetic Asian options with oating
strike and xed strike. Through the double obstacle problem, it is easy to show
that the upper price of the constrained arithmetic Asian option with oating strike
can be written as the Black-Scholes price of some associated unconstrained claim.
For the xed strike case, we nd that the upper price under the ratio constraint is
exactly equal to the price of the original claim without constraint, when tj > TK
and t in Problem 4.1.1 is constant and bigger than 1. However when tj < TK the
ratio constraint does aect the seller's hedging strategy and the upper price greatly.
Thanks to the equivalent double obstacle problem, we can eectively characterize
the seller's superhedging strategy.
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